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I.

INTRODUCTION

When it comes to corporate directors, it appears that our
society has tacitly agreed to spare them any significant legal
liability1 for failing to perform their duties as board members.
Thus, over the last twenty years, there has been a virtual
elimination of legal liability—particularly in the form of financial
2
penalties—for directors who breach their fiduciary duty of care.
This is true despite the fact that we entrust directors with the
awesome responsibility of monitoring all of America’s
corporations as well as the officers and agents within those
corporations.3 More surprisingly, at least from a statutory
perspective,4 this tacit agreement against legal liability for
1. This Article uses the term “legal liability” or “legal sanctions” to refer to
financial liability or incarceration imposed by law on individuals and encompasses both
civil and criminal liability. This Article uses the term “director liability” to refer to legal
liability imposed on corporate directors.
2. See infra Part III.B (explaining various mechanisms that allow directors to
avoid financial liability for breaching their duty of care).
3. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.01 (2002) (“All corporate powers shall be
exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation
managed by or under the direction of, its board of directors . . . .”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 141(a) (2001) (providing that the “business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors”).
4. As this Article was going to press, directors at WorldCom agreed to a settlement
in which they would personally pay $18 million of a $54 million settlement with
shareholders, while directors at Enron Corp. agreed to personally pay $13 million of a
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directors appears to have remained in place even after the wave
of corporate governance scandals and reform efforts aimed at
preventing their future recurrence. Thus, while the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley” or “the Act”)5 imposes
increased responsibilities on directors, it fails to impose any
direct legal penalties on directors who breach those
6
responsibilities.
Most corporate scholars appear to support the notion that
corporate directors should be spared legal liability for their
7
misconduct on corporate boards. These scholars not only insist
that other extra-legal measures sufficiently ensure directors’
compliance with their fiduciary duties, but also argue that legal
remedies are both costly and ineffective.8 Thus, the scholars
conclude that legal measures are neither necessary nor
9
appropriate for regulating director behavior.
This Article disagrees with the majority of scholars’
conclusion and asserts that legal liability represents an essential
mechanism for ensuring directors’ fidelity to their fiduciary
duties and for questioning reform efforts that do not include such
liability. In this regard, Sarbanes-Oxley represents an ideal
vehicle for exploring the broader issue of whether a corporate
governance system that shields its directors from legal liability
can curb directors’ irresponsibility and the abuses that result
from that irresponsibility.
Part I of this Article examines the provisions of SarbanesOxley that impose specific duties on corporate directors and
demonstrates
that
Sarbanes-Oxley
“federalizes”
many
components of directors’ fiduciary duty of care. Part I also
pinpoints instances of inappropriate director conduct that
suggest a need for such federalization. Part II analyzes SarbanesOxley’s impact on corporate director liability by exploring the
Act’s provisions for director liability and comparing those
provisions with both the Act’s provisions for officer liability and
the state and other federal mechanisms for director liability. Part

$168 million settlement with shareholders. See Ben White, Former Directors Agree to
Settle Class Actions; Enron, WorldCom Officials to Pay Out of Pocket, WASH. POST, Jan. 8,
2005, at E01. For a discussion of the possible ramifications of this settlement, see infra
Part III.C.
5. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745-810 (codified at scattered sections of 11, 15,
18, 28, and 29 U. S. C. (Supp. II 2004)) (2002).
6. See infra Part III.A.
7. See infra Part III.A.
8. See infra Part III.A (emphasizing the impact of capital markets and
reputational sanctions on director conduct).
9. See infra Part III.A.
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II also suggests that although Sarbanes-Oxley may have some
indirect (and unintentional) impact on directors’ exposure to legal
liability, this impact may ultimately fail to alter the state law
trend of eliminating director liability.
In light of this failure, Part III explores whether legal
liability is necessary to ensure directors’ adherence to their duty
of care. Part III begins with an analysis of arguments rejecting
reliance on legal sanctions, including those that stress the
positive impact of extra-legal sanctions on director conduct and
those that question the ability of legal sanctions to constrain
such conduct. Part III asserts that these arguments
underestimate the deterrent value of legal penalties and fail to
appreciate the degree to which extra-legal measures such as the
market or reputational sanctions depend on legal measures for
their effectiveness. This assertion is based in part on an
assessment of recent empirical evidence affirming the ability of
legal sanctions to influence corporate behavior. Part III concludes
by addressing those who conclude that legal sanctions are too
costly. Although Part III demonstrates that many have
overemphasized the costs of legal liability, it nevertheless offers
some measures for reducing those costs.
Based on Part III’s analysis, this Article concludes that legal
sanctions represent a vital aspect of any system seeking to
regulate director conduct. Consequently, reforms like SarbanesOxley may be defective because although they require directors
to oversee many aspects of a corporation’s financial reporting,
they make no specific provisions for sanctioning directors’ failure
to fulfill this function.
II. SARBANES-OXLEY AND THE FEDERALIZATION OF DIRECTORS’
DUTY OF CARE
State corporate statutes grant a significant amount of power
to corporations’ boards of directors.10 Indeed, these statutes
generally require that all corporate power be managed by or
under the direction of a board of directors.11 In practice, officers
and agents—not directors—manage the day-to-day affairs of the

10. See Robert W. Hamilton, Reflections of a Reporter, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1455, 1455
n.4 (1985) (stating that the 1950 Model Business Corporations Act “served as the basis of
codification for the corporation statutes of nine states from 1950 through 1959 and eleven
additional states from 1960 through 1969” and that “a number of provisions in other state
statutes have also been influenced by Model Act provisions”).
11. See supra note 3 (noting that by statute all corporate powers are managed by or
under the authority of the corporation’s board of directors).
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corporation.12 However, corporate statutes remind us that any
power these officers and agents wield ultimately stems from the
power that directors confer upon them.13
Statutes do not grant directors this power without some
corresponding obligation. Instead, statutes and case law impose
upon directors a responsibility to ensure that their corporate
power is exercised appropriately. This responsibility takes the
form of a fiduciary duty of care to act in the best interests of the
corporation.14 This duty not only encompasses a director’s
individual actions, but also encompasses a director’s
responsibility to oversee the actions of those to whom she
15
delegates power. Thus, directors have an obligation to monitor
corporate actors and remain informed about corporate
operations.16 Indeed, directors can be held liable for a breach of
12. See Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 943 (Del. 1985) (“The realities of
modern corporate life are such that directors cannot be expected to manage the day-to-day
activities of a company.”); see also The Business Roundtable, Principles of Corporate
Governance, May 2002, at 2, available at http://www.businessroundtable.org/pdf/704.pdf
[hereinafter Business Roundtable] (noting that board members delegate to managers the
authority and responsibility for the “everyday affairs of the corporation”).
13. This is not to say that statutes do not grant officers authority, but rather that
officers’ authority often is derivative of directors’ authority. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
ANN. § 8.41 (2002) (noting that each officer has the authority set forth in the corporation’s
bylaws or as prescribed to her by the board).
14. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.30(a) (2002) (“Each member of the board of
directors, when discharging the duties of a director, shall act: (1) in good faith, and (2) in a
manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.”);
§ 8.31 cmt. (noting that the standard of conduct in section 8.30 is frequently referred to as
a “director’s duty of care”). The duty of care provides the standard of conduct to which
directors must comply with respect to all ordinary actions. See § 8.30(a). Hence, this
Article focuses on that duty and the conduct that it encompasses. For transactions
involving a conflict of interest, directors have a fiduciary duty of loyalty, which essentially
ensures that directors act in good faith when they engage in transactions that might
create a conflict of interest. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2001) (providing that
conflict of interest transactions be approved by disinterested shareholders or directors or
be intrinsically fair to the corporation); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del.
1983) (“When directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they
are required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent
fairness of the bargain.”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.31(a)(2)(iii) (2002) (providing
that directors may be subject to liability for actions involving conflicts of interest that are
not in the best interests of the corporation).
15. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963)
(reasoning that the “duties [of directors] are those of control . . . [and that the] exercise [of]
proper control depends on the circumstances and facts of the particular case”); Briggs v.
Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 147 (1891) (stating that directors have a duty to “supervise the
business with attention . . . [and] use proper care in the appointment of agents”); MODEL
BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.31(f) cmt. (2002) (noting that directors have a decisionmaking
responsibility and an oversight function).
16. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.30 (2002) (requiring directors to “devot[e]
attention to their oversight function”); see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 875
(Del. 1985) (stating that directors have a duty to make reasonable inquiry of corporate
executives before approving a cash-out merger); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
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their fiduciary duty of care only if they neglect to monitor the
corporation’s business and affairs properly by failing to make
appropriate inquiries into corporate matters or by failing to
devote sufficient attention to those matters.17 Case law
emphasizes that directors’ fiduciary duty specifically includes a
responsibility to keep abreast of the corporation’s financial
18
affairs. Ultimately, directors’ fiduciary duty of care to remain
informed and ask probing questions of managers is designed to
protect against abuse of power by directors as well as by the
19
officers and agents who serve at the directors’ pleasure.
Investigative reports indicate that directors at Enron Corp.
20
(“Enron”) and at other corporations embroiled in financial
accounting scandals21 failed to fulfill their fiduciary duties. The
reports not only reveal defects in directors’ individual behaviors,
but more importantly reveal their failure to monitor adequately
and remain sufficiently informed about the behavior of others
upon whom they bestowed power.22 Congressional testimony has
1984) (mandating that “directors have a duty to inform themselves, prior to making a
business decision, of all material information reasonably available to them”); Francis v.
United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (N.J. 1981) (“Directors are under a continuing
obligation to keep informed about the activities of the corporation.”).
17. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.31(a)(2)(iv) (2002).
18. See, e.g., Francis, 432 A.2d at 822 (noting the directors have a responsibility to
maintain familiarity with the company’s financial affairs); Henshaw v. Am. Cement
Corp., 252 A.2d 125, 128 (Del. Ch. 1969) (finding that the director has a right and “often
has a duty” to inspect the corporation’s books).
19. See Troy A. Paredes, Enron: The Board, Corporate Governance, and Some
Thoughts on the Role of Congress, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS 495, 498–99 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004) (asserting
that directors need to monitor their officers because some officers may be “inclined to
shirk or otherwise act in their own self-interest”).
20. For a discussion of Enron Corp., see generally ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND
THEIR IMPLICATIONS (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004). See also John C.
Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid”, 57 BUS. LAW.
1403, 1403–04, 1412, 1419 (2002) (concluding that the Enron collapse was more about
“gatekeeper” failure than Board failure); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the
Enron Board and the New Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1125,
1127 (2003) (critiquing the performance of the Enron Board); Joan MacLeod Heminway,
Enron’s Tangled Web: Complex Relationships; Unanswered Questions, 71 U. CIN. L. REV.
1167, 1177–81 (2003) (exploring agency relationships in publicly-held corporations as they
related to the Enron collapse); Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of
Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1237 (2003) (using the “groupthink” theory to
analyze the Enron Board’s failure to monitor related-party transactions).
21. For a discussion of other corporate governance scandals, see generally Lisa M.
Fairfax, Form Over Substance?: Officer Certification and the Promise of Enhanced
Personal Accountability Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 6–8 (2002).
22. The chairman of the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
concluded that the Enron Board “knew about numerous questionable practices by Enron
management over several years, but it chose to ignore these red flags.” 148 CONG. REC.
S6561–64 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Levin, chairman of Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations) [hereinafter Subcommittee on Investigations Report].
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confirmed that these directors understood their obligation to
monitor the corporation and its financial affairs.23 Despite this
understanding, some directors have admitted to signing off on
company reports with limited or no knowledge of their contents,
while others have admitted to approving transactions even when
they did not fully understand them.24 Still other directors made
decisions regarding highly complex transactions after only brief
consideration of the issues critical to those transactions.25 These
actions appear contrary to the directors’ duty to remain informed
and suggest that instead of providing a vigorous check on
managerial conduct, the directors merely rubber-stamped
management’s decisions.26 Then too, despite their awareness of
27
potential risk, directors only made cursory inquiries into
transactions involving conflicts of interest or high-risk hedge
activity.28 Again, such conduct seems inconsistent with the
directors’ fiduciary obligation to ask probing questions before
approving company transactions.
Although there were many reasons for the corporate
29
governance failures exhibited by Enron and other entities, the
reports note that the fact that directors did not diligently perform
Similarly, the special investigative committee of Enron’s board, appointed by Congress
and chaired by William C. Powers, concluded that the board failed to live up to its
oversight responsibilities with respect to various related party transactions. See Report of
Investigation by the Special Investigation Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron
Corp., Feb. 1, 2002, 149 [hereinafter Powers Report] (noting the Enron board members’
failure to make the inquiries necessary under the Enron Code of Conduct to permit
approval of conflict of interest transactions between Enron and its CFO); id. at 157 (citing
lack of detailed questions related to certain business transactions); id. at 162–64 (noting
the limited board review of major transactions).
23. See S. Rep. No. 107-70, at 14–15, 24–37 (2002) (citing statements of various
Enron board members detailing the responsibilities of board and committee members and
criticizing the general lack of oversight).
24. See Jackie Spinner & David S. Hilzenrath, Enron CEO Felt “Betrayed,” Panel
Told: Head of Internal Probe Testifies on the Hill, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2002, at A1
(reporting that former Enron chairman Kenneth Lay claimed that he did not pay enough
attention or fully appreciate financial information within company documents); see also
Subcommittee on Investigations Report, supra note 22, at S6564 (noting that Enron board
members who signed company financial statements “claimed they didn’t know what was
going on in the company”); Powers Report, supra note 22, at 162–64 (finding that the
Enron Board made decisions about various transactions without considering critical
issues and information relevant to those transactions).
25. See Powers Report, supra note 22, at 162–64 (pointing out the Enron Board’s
limited scrutiny of various conflict of interest transactions).
26. See Paredes, supra note 19, at 504, 535.
27. See Powers Report, supra note 22, at 154–56 (noting the Enron directors’
awareness of the risky nature of the transactions they approved).
28. See id. at 149, 157 (pinpointing limited inquiries concerning specific conflict of
interest transactions and hedging activity).
29. See generally Fairfax, supra note 21 (discussing some of the other corporate
scandals of recent years).
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their oversight functions significantly contributed to these
failures.30 As the primary monitors of the corporate enterprise,
directors serve as one of the primary, and possibly final, checks
31
on misbehavior within that enterprise. As a consequence, “to
the extent that other corporate governance devices fail, the board
of directors becomes all the more important.”32 In other words,
given their role within the corporate structure, directors’ failure
to fulfill their fiduciary duty of diligently seeking to curb abuses
of power is particularly problematic. From this perspective, by
failing to perform their monitoring duties with sufficient rigor,
Enron directors acquiesced in, and thus contributed to, corporate
misconduct.33
In an apparent effort to restore directors’ adherence to their
fiduciary duty, Sarbanes-Oxley imposes responsibilities on
directors similar to the responsibilities required under state
corporate fiduciary law, appearing to “federalize” that law.34 Most
notably, Sarbanes-Oxley enhances the monitoring role of
directors by making directors who serve on the audit committee
of a corporation responsible for closely overseeing auditors’ work
as well as any disagreements related to that work.35 Indeed, the
provision of Sarbanes-Oxley that most comprehensively impacts

30. See Subcommittee on Investigations Report, supra note 22, at S6564 (noting
that Enron board members’ failure to curb high risk accounting practices and various
conflicts of interest contributed to the collapse of Enron). After his investigation of Enron,
William Powers concluded that the company’s fraudulent transactions “could and should
have been avoided” if executives and board members had taken their fiduciary obligations
more seriously. The Financial Collapse of Enron—Part 1: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th
Cong. 18–19 (2002) (statement of William C. Powers, Jr., Chairman of the Special
Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corporation); see also Carrie
Johnson, Enron Board Aided Collapse, Senate Panel Says: Report Finds Directors
Approved Conflicts of Interest, Large Cash Bonuses, WASH. POST, July 7, 2002, at A10
(citing Senate reports of Enron directors ignoring questionable practices and permitting
questionable high-risk practices).
31. See Marin Lipton, Some Thoughts for Boards of Directors, 1467 PRACTISING L.
INST., CORP. L. & PRAC. HANDBOOK SERIES 131, 138 (2005) (describing directors as
“monitors” and “gatekeepers”).
32. Paredes, supra note 19, at 504.
33. Subcommittee on Investigations Report, supra note 22, at S6564 (noting that
the directors failed to protect Enron shareholders and that such failure contributed to
Enron’s collapse); see also Johnson, supra note 30 (reporting the Senate report’s
conclusion that Enron directors’ failure to sufficiently probe conflict of interest
transactions contributed to the firm’s collapse).
34. For a discussion of the federalization of corporate law, see generally Stephen M.
Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE’s Director Independence Listing Standards, 30 SEC.
REG. L.J. 370, 396–99 (2002); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to
Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 57–61
(2002).
35. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (Supp. II 2002).
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corporate directors’ conduct relates to the audit committee of a
corporation’s board of directors.36 Section 301 requires companies
to have an audit committee comprised solely of independent
37
directors and makes the audit committee responsible not only
for appointing and compensating the company’s auditors, but
also for overseeing the work of the auditors.38 Sarbanes-Oxley
further requires the audit committee to oversee any financial
reporting disagreements between the corporation’s management
and its auditors.39 Additionally, audit committees must establish
procedures for receiving and treating complaints relating to
accounting or auditing matters, including procedures for
anonymous submission by employees who have concerns
40
regarding questionable accounting or auditing practices.
Through these provisions, Sarbanes-Oxley imposes an
oversight function on audit committee members similar to
directors’ more general monitoring duty under state fiduciary
law. And like state law, this oversight function apparently
includes a responsibility to remain informed and make queries
41
about the financial work of auditors. Specifically, by making
audit committee members responsible for management
disagreements as well as employee complaints about financial
matters, Sarbanes-Oxley requires audit committee members to
remain informed about accounting and financial processes and to

36. Indeed, one of the Act’s key provisions is the creation of a Public Accounting
Oversight Board, whose members are appointed by the SEC and whose function is to
oversee the audit of public companies and ensure the independence of audit reports. See
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 7211. Other provisions that relate to directors
include Section 305 of Sarbanes-Oxley, which expands the ability of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) to bar and penalize directors, Sarbanes-Oxley Act
§ 305 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(e), 78u(d)); Section 306, which prohibits directors from
trading in company securities during pension fund “blackout” periods, Sarbanes-Oxley Act
§ 306, 15 U.S.C. § 7244; and Section 402, which prohibits personal loans to directors,
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 402, 15 U.S.C. § 78m.
37. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3). In order to be considered
independent, an audit committee member may not accept any compensation from the
issuer other than in her capacity as a board committee member and may not be affiliated
with the company or its subsidiaries. Id. Audit committees must also “disclose whether or
not . . . at least one member is a ‘financial expert.’” Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 407, 15 U.S.C.
§ 7265.
38. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301(m)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(2).
39. Id.
40. See id. § 301(m)(4)(A)-(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4).
41. Compare Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301(m)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(2) (requiring
that the audit committee of the board of directors oversee financial auditor’s work) with
Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 821–22 (N.J. 1981) (discussing a director’s
duty to remain informed about their corporation’s financial status through the periodic
review of financial statements, the frequency of which depends on the size of the
corporation).
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ask probing questions about these processes.42 This responsibility
also ensures that directors are aware of possible financial
problems. Like state fiduciary law, these provisions of SarbanesOxley particularly focus directors’ attention on the financial
affairs of the corporation, making audit committee directors
ultimately responsible for monitoring the flow of financial
information within the corporation.
While Sarbanes-Oxley imposes primary responsibility for
internal control procedures on management, these requirements
also impact the board of directors. Section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley
requires a company’s CEO and CFO to certify in each annual or
quarterly report both that they are responsible for establishing
and maintaining internal controls designed to ensure that
material information is made known to them and that they have
43
evaluated the effectiveness of those controls. Section 302 also
requires these officers to disclose to the board’s audit committee
any significant deficiencies in the design or operation of the
internal controls that could adversely affect the company’s ability
to record and report financial data.44 These disclosure obligations
implicate the directors’ duty to keep abreast of corporate
financial affairs and the transactions underlying those affairs.
Then too, because audit committee directors must receive reports
about deficiencies in the internal control process, they may have
an obligation to respond to those reports. This obligation
suggests that directors must remain knowledgeable about
corporate internal controls and ask questions about those
controls and their defects. In this respect, section 302 implicates
directors’ monitoring responsibilities embedded in the duty of
care.
A similar implication arises from another Sarbanes-Oxley’s
provision involving internal control procedures. Section 404
requires that each annual report “state the responsibility of
management for establishing . . . adequate internal control
structure[s] and procedures” and include “an assessment . . . of
the effectiveness of [those controls] and procedures.”45 This
information implicates the board because at least a majority of
board members must sign the annual report.46 The SEC
42. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(2), (m)(4).
43. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(4).
44. Id., 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(5).
45. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a).
46. Congress amended the signature requirements for annual reports in 1980 to
require that the CEO, the CFO, and a majority of the board sign such reports. See
Accounting Releases, Amendments to Annual Report Form, Securities Act Release No.
6231, Exchange Act Release No. 17,114, [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
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maintains that directors who sign the annual report implicitly
assert their belief in the accuracy of the report.47 In order to
support this belief, directors who sign annual reports should
familiarize themselves with the information contained within.
Thus, while board members do not have a direct obligation with
respect to internal control procedures, their signing
responsibilities require them to monitor and remain informed
about those procedures.
The Act’s rules regarding attorneys also impose fiduciarylike obligations on directors, making them directly or indirectly
responsible for receiving and responding to complaints about
48
securities fraud or fiduciary duty violations. Section 307 of
Sarbanes-Oxley directs the SEC to establish a rule requiring
attorneys who appear or practice before the SEC “to report
evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of
fiduciary duty . . . by the company” or its agent to the chief legal
counsel or CEO of the company.49 Section 307 further provides
that if either counsel or the CEO does not appropriately respond
to this evidence, the attorney must report the evidence to the
audit committee, another committee of independent directors, or
50
the entire board of directors. The SEC codified this provision in
Rule 205 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the
“Exchange Act”).51 Additionally, the SEC provided for an
52
alternative procedure. To this end, Rule 205 also allows
corporations to establish a qualified legal compliance committee

(CCH) ¶ 72,301, at 62,812–13 (Sept. 2, 1980) (amending signature requirement for annual
report).
47. Audit Committee Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 41,987, [1999-2000
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,209, at 82,414 (Oct. 7, 1999).
48. For an in-depth analysis of Section 307, see Roger C. Cramton et al., Legal and
Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725, 740–71 (2004);
Susan J. Stabile, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Rules of Professional Responsibility Viewed Through a
Sextonian Lens, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 31, 37–42 (2004).
49. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307(l), 15 U.S.C. § 7245(l) (Supp. II 2004). Although
Congress intended this rule to apply to all lawyers practicing before the SEC, the SEC
narrowed the application and therefore excluded certain categories of lawyers, including
some foreign lawyers and those who appear before the SEC outside of the attorney-client
relationship. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(a)(1), (2) (2004); see also Cramton et al., supra note 48,
at 740–51 (discussing the kinds of lawyers who fall within the SEC’s definition).
50. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307(2), 15 U.S.C. § 7245(2); see also Cramton et al., supra
note 48, at 751–79 (discussing conduct that triggers attorneys’ reporting duties); Stabile,
supra note 48, at 41–42 (analyzing reporting requirements).
51. See 17 C.F.R § 205.3(b) (stating that if an attorney becomes aware of a violation,
“the attorney shall report such evidence to the issuer’s chief legal officer . . . or to both the
issuer’s chief legal officer and its chief executive officer”).
52. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(c).
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(QLCC),53 which must (1) be composed of independent directors
and (2) have “procedures for the confidential receipt, retention,
and consideration . . . of evidence” involving securities fraud or
54
fiduciary duty breaches. If a QLCC exists, an attorney may
report to the QLCC instead of reporting to counsel or the CEO.55
The QLCC then has the responsibility of determining if an
investigation is warranted and if so, the QLCC must initiate
one.56 Following an investigation, the QLCC must recommend an
appropriate response and inform the audit committee or the
57
entire board of that response.
These provisions require directors to remain informed and to
monitor not only attorneys, but also other agents in the
58
corporation who may be engaged in fraudulent activities.
Indeed, whether a corporation has a QLCC or not, SarbanesOxley requires board members to conduct some form of
investigation into and make appropriate inquiries about
violations of relevant laws.59 This requirement should ensure that
directors will be heavily involved with internal investigations of
their corporation and it does augment directors’ duty of care in
this area.60
Taken together, these provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley impose
fiduciary-like duties on directors. While several cases suggest
that directors generally already have a duty to oversee the
financial affairs of their corporation, including its internal
control procedures,61 Sarbanes-Oxley adds teeth to the directors’
53. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(k) (setting forth the requirements for establishing a
QLCC).
54. Id. At least one member of the committee must be a member of the board’s audit
committee. Id.
55. Id. § 205.3(c)(1).
56. Id. § 205.3(c)(2).
57. Id. § 205.2(k).
58. See id. § 205.3(c)(1) (allowing attorneys to report violations “by the issuer or by
any officer, director, employee, or agent of the issuer”).
59. See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text.
60. Cramton notes that the obligations imposed upon securities lawyers by
Sarbanes-Oxley are not new, but instead “reflect the duties of lawyers under the ethics
rules of the vast majority of American jurisdictions.” Cramton et al., supra note 48, at
830. However, even if reporting obligations are not new, their “federalization” may
encourage attorney adherence to these rules in a manner similar to the goal of directors’
obligations. See id.
The characterization of these rules as novel requirements that would result in a
fundamental change in the relationship of a lawyer to a corporate client is hot
air: a hullabaloo stirred up primarily to defeat or limit a new vehicle of
regulation that might, unlike the disciplinary process of the states, provide a
substantial deterrent to lawyer assistance of corporate fraud and criminality.
Id.
61. For a discussion of these duties, see In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig.,
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obligation by creating some greater specificity regarding this
duty. Moreover, these requirements regulate the internal
operations of corporate boards in a manner traditionally reserved
to the states.62 In this way, Sarbanes-Oxley not only federalizes
corporate fiduciary duties, but also adds substance to them. This
federalization represents an attempt to restore directors’ fidelity
to their fiduciary duties. The critical question, however, is
whether that attempt will prove successful.
III. SARBANES-OXLEY AND THE DIRECTOR EXONERATION TREND
Seeking to answer the above question, this Part explores the
impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on director liability. This exploration
reveals that although Sarbanes-Oxley increases the duties of
directors, the Act fails to provide significant direct provisions for
ensuring that directors comply with those increased new duties.
This failure appears intentional given the stark contrast between
the Act’s treatment of directors and that of officers, who face
personal liability for noncompliance with the Act. Moreover, it
appears consistent with the state law trend toward virtual
elimination of director liability.63 Although this Part reveals that
Sarbanes-Oxley indirectly may serve to undercut this trend, it
questions whether indirect measures will be sufficient to ensure
698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
[C]orporate boards [could not] satisfy their obligation to be reasonably informed
concerning the corporation, without assuring themselves that information and
reporting systems exist in the organization that are reasonably designed to
provide to senior management and to the board itself timely, accurate
information sufficient to allow management and the board, each within its scope,
to reach informed judgments concerning both the corporation’s compliance with
law and its business performance.
Id.
62. Listing requirements, such as those promulgated by the New York Stock
Exchange, also serve to impose requirements on the internal operations of corporations in
a manner traditionally reserved to state law. See Bainbridge, supra note 34, at 396–97;
see also Lyman P. Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary
Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1216–17 (2004) (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley
creates a new federal presence and that it may impact the analysis of directors’ fiduciary
duties).
63. This examination of state law focuses on Delaware because it stands as the
state with the largest number of public corporations and hence the most influential
corporate law regime. See, e.g., S. Samuel Arsht, A History of Delaware Corporation Law,
1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 1 (1976) (stating that Delaware corporate law is “the most popular of
such laws in the United States”); Marc Gunther, Ovitz v. Eisner: Boards Beware!,
FORTUNE, Nov. 10, 2003, at 171, 172 (reporting that “more than half of the Fortune 500”
are incorporated in Delaware); R. Cammon Turner, Shareholders vs. The World; ‘Revlon
Duties’ and State Constituency Statutes, BUS. L. TODAY, Jan.–Feb. 1999, at 34 (stating
that Delaware is the “state of incorporation of more than 40 percent of the companies
listed on the New York Stock Exchange” and that “[m]ost states . . . look to Delaware law
when interpreting local corporate law”).
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that directors face legal liability for breaches of their fiduciary
obligations.
A. Sarbanes-Oxley and Director Liability
Sarbanes-Oxley only includes two provisions that specifically
impose legal liability on directors for their service. First, the Act
expands the SEC’s ability to remove directors and to bar them
from serving on the boards of public companies. Section 305
provides that the SEC can effect such removals and bars by
showing a director’s “unfitness,” as opposed to “substantial
unfitness,” for the position.64 This lowered standard represents an
65
increase in the SEC’s ability to remove or bar directors. Second,
section 306 of Sarbanes-Oxley requires directors to disgorge
profits realized from trades made during periods when pension
rules prevent their company’s shareholders from doing the same,
defined as pension fund “black-out periods”;66 it also prohibits
directors and officers from trading in their company’s stock
67
during such periods and allows the company or its shareholders
to recover any profit realized from trades made during that
time.68 Such profits are recoverable regardless of a director’s
69
intent. At least in this limited way, Sarbanes-Oxley imposes
personal liability on directors.70 However, Sarbanes-Oxley fails to
impose any legal sanctions on directors who do not comply with
71
their responsibilities under the Act.

64. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 305 (striking the term “substantial unfitness” from 15
U.S.C § 78u(d)(2) and 15 U.S.C. § 77t(e) (2000 & Supp. II 2002) and inserting the term
“unfitness”).
65. See Phillip F.S. Berg, Note, Unfit to Serve: Permanently Barring People from
Serving as Officers and Directors of Publicly Traded Companies After the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1871, 1888–89 (2003) (explaining that new SEC provisions lower
the requisite standard and allow the SEC to suspend directors and officers directly).
66. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 306(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7244(a) (Supp. II 2002). A black-out
period is a period of more than three consecutive business days during which at least fifty
percent of the beneficiaries or participants in a pension plan do not have the ability to
trade company securities. Id. § 306(a)(4), § 7244(a)(4).
67. Id. § 306(a)(1), § 7244(a)(1).
68. Id. § 306(a)(2), § 7244(a)(2). Sarbanes-Oxley allows any shareholder to bring an
action to recover these profits on behalf of the company if the company refuses to bring
such an action within sixty days after the request, or if the company fails to diligently
prosecute the action. Id.
69. See id. (requiring that any profit realized by a director during a blackout period
“shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part
of such director or executive officer in entering into the transaction”).
70. See id. (placing liability on the director for any profit realized during the blackout period).
71. See Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, The Qualified Legal Compliance
Committee: Using the Attorney Conduct Rules to Restructure the Board of Directors, 53
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This failure stands in stark contrast with the Act’s liability
provision for CEOs and CFOs. Like it does for directors,
Sarbanes-Oxley creates new responsibilities for CEOs and CFOs;
those responsibilities include requiring such officers to certify the
accuracy of financial information within reports their companies
72
file with the SEC. However, unlike it does for directors,
Sarbanes-Oxley specifically ties violations of officer certification
responsibilities to legal sanctions.73 Thus, section 906 provides
that officers who knowingly violate the certification provision
face a maximum penalty of one million dollars, a maximum
prison term of ten years, or both.74 Willful violators face a
maximum fine of five million dollars, a maximum of twenty years
75
in prison, or both. In contrast, Sarbanes-Oxley contains no such
liability provisions for directors who violate their obligations
relating to the audit committee or to other matters.76
In light of the liability imposed upon officers, the lack of
liability for directors appears purposeful. Indeed, the existence of
section 906 suggests that Congress could have included a parallel
section on director liability if it had so desired. The absence of
such a section suggests a lack of desire to hold directors legally
liable for failing to fulfill their Sarbanes-Oxley responsibilities.
B.

Comparison with Director Liability Under Corporate
Fiduciary Law

Because Sarbanes-Oxley imposes duties that are fiduciary in
nature, it is possible that Congress believed it could rely on
existing corporate governance measures to hold directors liable
for breaches of those duties. However, to anyone paying attention
to corporate fiduciary law and the sanctions related thereto, this
reliance appears misplaced. Over the last twenty years, a variety
of mechanisms have contributed to a virtual elimination of legal

DUKE L.J. 517, 519–20 (2003) (noting that “Sarbanes-Oxley did not impose federal
standards for director liability”).
72. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 302, 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (Supp. II 2002). For a
general discussion of the impact of this certification requirement on officers’ liability, see
Fairfax, supra note 21, at 20–46.
73. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1350.
74. See id. § 906(c)(1), 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c)(1). Previous versions of the Act only
authorized a $500,000 maximum fine and a five-year prison term, reserving the more
significant penalties for willful violations. See, e.g., H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2002).
75. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 906(c)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c)(2). These sanctions
represent an increase from previous versions of the Act which only subjected officers to a
one-million-dollar maximum fine and a ten-year prison term for willful violations. See,
e.g., H.R. 3763.
76. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 71, at 519–20.
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liability for directors who breach their duty of care under state
law.77
1. Procedural Hurdles and the Demand Requirement. As an
initial matter, the procedural rules related to shareholder suits
for fiduciary duty breaches make it difficult for shareholders to
78
even bring an action challenging director conduct in this area.
Before a shareholder can bring a derivative suit alleging a
director’s violation of her fiduciary duty, most jurisdictions
require that a shareholder make a demand on the corporation’s
board of directors, unless demand is excused, requesting that the
board take suitable action against the specified director.79 The
shareholder’s demand allows the board to assess the allegations
and determine whether or not a lawsuit is appropriate.80 After
such an assessment, the board can decide not to bring any action
81
against the director. This is the decision that most boards
reach,82 and although shareholders can challenge it, most courts
defer to boards on this matter.83 Consequently, although the
demand requirement was designed to prevent director liability
for meritless claims, it also undermines shareholders’ ability to
hold directors accountable for meritorious claims.84 If demand is
77. This elimination appears consistent with other countries. Indeed, a recent study
by Professors Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins, and Michael Klausner of six countries,
including Australia, Canada, Britain, France, Germany, and Japan, found that directors
of public companies in those countries rarely face financial liability in connection with the
malperformance of their responsibilities as directors. See generally BERNARD BLACK ET
AL., LIABILITY RISK FOR OUTSIDE DIRECTORS: A CROSS-BORDER ANALYSIS 3, 16 (U. Tex. L.
& Econ. Working Paper No. 27, 2004; Stan. L. & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 285,
2004), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=557070; BERNARD BLACK & BRIAN CHEFFINS, OUTSIDE
DIRECTOR LIABILITY ACROSS COUNTRIES 92–97 (U. Tex. L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 31,
2004; Stan. L. & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 266, 2004), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
438321.
78. For other procedural rules that undermine the ability of shareholders to bring
derivative actions, see John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the
Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
261, 312–14 (1981).
79. See Carol B. Swanson, Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in
Derivative Litigation: The ALI Drops the Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1349 & n.55 (1993).
80. See id. at 1349–50 (noting that the demand process enables board members to
analyze derivative actions).
81. Id. at 1350.
82. Id. at 1350 n.60.
83. See id. at 1350 (“[B]usiness executives—not judges—are trained to make this
significant business judgment.”).
84. See Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 78, at 326 (“[T]he ability of even a truly
independent board to terminate an action plainly means that meritorious cases will
sometimes be aborted.”); Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules
and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 286 (1986) (noting that liability rules have lost their effectiveness
because of procedural hurdles); Harry G. Hutchinson, Presumptive Business Judgment,
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excused because the director is interested in the underlying
transaction, shareholders can bring a suit against that director
without first making a demand on the board.85 However, boards
can appoint a special litigation committee of disinterested
directors to assess the shareholder’s suit, and the board can
make a motion to dismiss the suit upon the committee’s
86
recommendation. Not only do most boards make such motions,
but in the vast majority of cases courts grant the motion based on
the special litigation committee’s recommendation.87 Thus,
whether demand is made or excused, the board of directors, as an
entire body or through a committee, generally determines that
suits against directors should not proceed. For this reason,
scholars agree that the procedural rules related to derivative
suits severely limit the ability of shareholders to bring legal
actions to impose liability on directors for violating their
fiduciary duty.88
2. The Business Judgment Rule. Even if shareholders
overcome this procedural hurdle, the tremendous deference
courts grant to board decisions means that courts hold directors
liable for only the most egregious examples of director
89
misconduct. Courts analyze actions involving breach of a
Substantive Good Faith, Litigation Control: Vindicating the Socioeconomic Meaning of
Harhen v. Brown, 26 J. CORP. L. 285, 292 (2001) (outlining procedural requirements that
prevent the filing of even meritorious claims); Donald E. Schwartz, In Praise of Derivative
Suits: A Commentary on the Paper of Professors Fischel and Bradley, 71 CORNELL L. REV.
322, 339–40 (1986) (noting that derivative suits are endangered by the Delaware courts’
reluctance to excuse demand and imposition of the business judgment rule on those cases
in which demand is required); Carol B. Swanson, Corporate Governance: Sliding
Seamlessly into the Twenty-First Century, 21 J. CORP. L. 417, 437 (1996) (explaining that
procedural hurdles make it difficult for shareholders to get the merits of their claims
before the courts).
85. In some jurisdictions, shareholders do not have to make a demand if their
complaint creates a reasonable doubt that “(1) the directors are disinterested and
independent and (2) the challenged transaction [is] otherwise the product of a valid
exercise of business judgment.” Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984). In such a
situation, demand is considered “excused.” Id. at 815.
86. Swanson, supra note 79, at 1356–57.
87. See id. at 1357–58 (“Management’s use of this device has motivated courts
to . . . defer to the committee’s determination more often.”); see also Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1980) (“[A] board decision . . . will be respected unless
it was wrongful.”); Swanson, supra note 84, at 437 (explaining that “shareholders have
tremendous difficulty in getting the merits of the[ir] claim before the court” because of the
demand rule).
88. See Swanson, supra note 79, at 1358–59 n.118 (explaining that litigation
committees routinely dismiss plaintiffs’ actions).
89. In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., CIV. A. No. 10389, 1989 WL 7036, at
*14 n.13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) (noting that the business judgment rule contemplates
limited substantive review for judgments that are “egregious,” “irrational,” or “so beyond
reason”).
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director’s fiduciary duty of care under the business judgment
rule.90 The reliance of courts on this rule reflects an extreme
reluctance to interfere with or second guess business decisions of
91
boards. The justification for this rule is that board members,
because of their business background and experience, are bettersuited than courts to make business decisions.92 Hence, the
business judgment rule protects directors from liability by
sanctioning all decisions made in good faith, even if courts
disagree with those decisions.93 Indicative of this protection,
shareholders rarely succeed when they bring actions based on a
violation of the directors’ fiduciary duty of care.94 Smith v. Van
Gorkom stands out as an important exception because the court
in that case found the directors personally liable for breaching
their duty of care.95 In Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court
held an entire board, consisting of ten directors, liable for

90. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811–12 (explaining that the business judgment rule
forces the plaintiff to rebut the presumption of good business practices on the part of
directors); Charles Hansen, The ALI Corporate Governance Project: Of the Duty of Due
Care and the Business Judgment Rule, a Commentary, 41 BUS. LAW. 1237, 1240 (1986)
(noting that the “applicable duty as applied by the courts . . . is ultimately linked
to . . . the ‘business judgment rule’”); see also Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once More, the
Business Judgment Rule, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 573, 573–76 & n.1 (describing the elements of
the business judgment rule as “(1) good-faith, (2) no self-dealing or self-interest, (3) an
informed decision, and (4) a reasonable belief that the decision is in the best interest of
the corporation”).
91. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (“A
hallmark of the business judgment rule is that a court will not substitute its judgment for
that of the board . . . .”); Hansen, supra note 90, at 1239–40 (stating that the “foundation
stone” of corporate governance is the idea that “there must be a minimum of interference
by the courts in internal corporate affairs”).
92. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (“The business judgment rule is an
acknowledgment of . . . managerial prerogative[].”); see also Hansen, supra note 90, at
1239 (stating that there will be fewer directors willing to serve and “bold entrepreneurial
decisions” will decrease if “directors are to be second-guessed as to the substance of their
decisions”). See generally Davis, supra note 90 (discussing the business judgment rule in
detail).
93. See Hansen, supra note 90, at 1239 (“The key point is that a director’s legal duty
of care cannot . . . be measured by result. It should be measured only by process . . . .”); see
also Cramer v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 274 (3d Cir. 1978) (noting that
“[a]bsent bad faith . . . directors are normally not liable to the corporation for mistakes of
judgment”).
94. Indeed, there are very few reported cases holding directors liable for a breach of
their fiduciary duty outside of self-interested transactions. See Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of
the Director’s Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the
Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 591 nn.1–2 (1983) (finding only seven
successful cases); see also Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New
Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078,
1099 (1968) (finding only four successful shareholder cases); accord Henry Ridgely
Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the Delaware Business Judgment Rule, 19 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 971, 982 (1994) (affirming Bishop’s study).
95. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985).
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breaching their duty of care after finding that they had failed to
make an informed business decision when they voted to approve
a cash-out merger of their company.96 The court held the directors
97
liable for $33.5 million. The decision shocked the business
community, particularly because the directors were precisely the
kind of seasoned and sophisticated business people whose
decisions appeared worthy of protection under the business
judgment rule.98 This case appears to be the exception that proves
the rule.99 As one scholar concludes, the business judgment rule
serves as a “nearly insurmountable” barrier to director liability,
with Van Gorkom standing out as the “one major instance in
which nonconflicted managers were held liable to pay for their
100
mismanagement.” More importantly, in a recent study from
1968 to 2003 focusing on suits involving outside directors of
public companies, Professors Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins, and
Michael Klausner found that Van Gorkom was the only
corporate-law case that imposed out-of-pocket liability on
directors.101

96. Id. at 862, 893.
[W]e hold that the directors of Trans Union breached their fiduciary duty to
their stockholders (1) by their failure to inform themselves of all information
reasonably available to them and relevant to their decision to recommend the
Pritzker merger; and (2) by their failure to disclose all material information such
as a reasonable stockholder would consider important in deciding whether to
approve the Pritzker offer.
Id.
97. See Sara R. Slaughter, Note, Statutory and Non-Statutory Responses to the
Director and Officer Liability Insurance Crisis, 63 IND. L.J. 181, 184 (1987). The
company’s insurer paid the policy limit of ten million dollars, and the directors had
personal responsibility for the remaining $23.5 million. Id. However, the company’s
acquirer ultimately paid the bulk of the directors’ remaining portion of liability. Id. at 184
n.21.
98. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIP AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 830 (8th ed.
2003) (“The response of the corporate bar to Van Gorkom was one of shocked
incredulity.”); Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care
Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1, 40 (1989) (“[T]he [Van Gorkom]
decision came as a shock to the corporate community.”); see also Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at
894 (McNeilly, J., dissenting) (referring to the majority’s decision as a “comedy of errors”
and pointing out the extensive business experience of the directors as evidence that they
deserved the protection of the business judgment rule).
99. In fact, Professors Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout argue that Van Gorkom is
consistent with the rule because its ultimate effect was “to insulate directors from liability
whenever they make even a modest attempt to follow the appropriate [procedural]
formalities.” Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1790 (2001).
100. Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law’s Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 243 (2002).
101. BERNARD BLACK ET AL., OUTSIDE DIRECTOR LIABILITY 6 & tbl.I (Stan. L. & Econ.
Olin Working Paper No. 250, 2003), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=382422 (studying actual
out-of-pocket liability rather than nominal liability).
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3. Exculpatory Statutes, Indemnification, and Insurance.
Even if shareholder plaintiffs overcome the procedural hurdles
necessary to get their day in court and convince the sitting judge
to hold directors liable for breach of fiduciary duty by successfully
rebutting the nearly insurmountable presumption of the business
judgment rule, the combination of exculpatory statutes,
indemnification provisions, and directors’ and officers’ (“D&O”)
liability insurance—all of which are discussed below—means
that such directors generally will not bear any out-of-pocket
102
103
In response to Van Gorkom,
liability for their breach.
Delaware enacted Rule 102(b)(7), which allows a corporation to
limit or eliminate personal liability for directors who breach their
104
105
duty of care. Soon after, every state followed suit. These
statutes are referred to as “exculpatory statutes.”106 A
corporation’s adoption of an exculpatory statute means that
directors not only avoid financial liability for their misconduct
but also are able to secure automatic dismissal of lawsuits in
which shareholders’ sole allegation is a duty of care violation.107

102. Id. at 5.
103. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1166 n.18 (Del. 1995)
(stating that Section 102(b)(7) was enacted in response to Van Gorkom); Bradley &
Schipani, supra note 98, at 43 (same); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 2.02 cmt. 3(i) (2002)
(noting that Van Gorkom and other developments highlighted the need for a limiting
liability statute).
104. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). Corporations can adopt such a
provision in their charter. Id. This section does not enable corporations to limit or
eliminate liability for breaches involving the duty of loyalty, the duty of good faith, the
unlawful distribution of dividends, or transactions in which directors received an
improper personal benefit. Id. The Model Business Corporation Act goes further than
Delaware, allowing corporations to eliminate financial liability of directors except for
financial benefits received by the director, intentional harm inflicted on the corporation or
its shareholders, unlawful distributions, or intentional violations of criminal law. See
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 2.02(b)(4).
105. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the
Governance of Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 332 n.93 (2004) (noting that by
2003, all fifty states had statutes enabling corporations to limit or eliminate personal
liability for directors); see also HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 98, at 832 (noting that as
of January 1999, forty-three states had adopted similar statutes); Roberta Romano,
Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1160
(1990) (noting that within two years of Van Gorkom, forty-one states had adopted
exculpatory statutes).
106. See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 458
(2004).
107. See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1095–96 (Del. 2001) (noting that when
a complaint exclusively alleges violations of the duty of care, it is dismissible once
directors invoke the corporation’s 102(b)(7) provision); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787
A.2d 85, 91 (Del. 2001) (noting that a claim is dismissible when the sole allegation relates
to due care (citing Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1093, 1095)). The Delaware Supreme Court has
held recently that when a court has to conduct an entire fairness review because “the
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In so doing, these statutes not only severely reduce the threat of
director liability,108 but also “minimize the opportunity for courts
to patrol and reinforce the boundaries of business judgment.”109
As a complement to exculpatory statutes, states also enable
corporations to indemnify directors who are found liable for
breaching the duty of care.110 Some states also enable
corporations to make director indemnification mandatory,
depriving corporations of the ability to pick and choose the kind
111
of director breaches that will entail personal liability.
In
addition to indemnification for legal liability, most states require
corporations to indemnify directors for reasonable expenses they
incur in successfully defending against any proceeding brought
against them based on their director status.112 Thus,
indemnification provisions ensure that directors escape financial
responsibility for any ultimate judgment as well as costs
associated with litigating that judgment.
These provisions for indemnification combine with D&O
insurance to solidify the virtual obliteration of director liability.
All states allow corporations to purchase insurance on behalf of
113
their directors and officers. Although public policy prohibits
corporations from insuring against directors’ willful conduct,114
states generally allow corporations to insure directors for actions
even when corporations could not indemnify directors for those
actions.115 Then too, the availability of D&O insurance and

inherently interested nature of those transactions are inextricably intertwined with
issues of loyalty” then an automatic dismissal is not appropriate, and instead the impact
of the statute can only be considered after a determination of liability is made. See
Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 92–94. For a discussion of the implications of this holding,
see generally Stephen A. Radin, Director Protection Statutes and Motions to Dismiss After
Emerald Partners, INSIGHTS: THE CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR, June 1999, at 2, available at
http://www.weil.com/wgm/pages/Controller.jsp?z=r&sz=0 (last visited Apr. 24, 2005).
108. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1253, 1267–68 (1999) (noting that the net effect of exculpatory statutes was to drastically
reduce the threat of liability for directors who breach their duty of care).
109. Mae Kuykendall, Symmetry and Dissonance in Corporate Law: Perfecting the
Exoneration of Directors, Corrupting Indemnification and Straining the Framework of
Corporate Law, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 443, 479.
110. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 2.02(b)(5) (2002); Bradley & Schipani,
supra note 98, at 31 n.190 (citing statutes).
111. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 2.02(b)(5); Bradley & Schipani, supra
note 98, at 31 & nn.190–92 (citing statutes); see also Kuykendall, supra note 109, at 468
(discussing the formal linking of the standards for indemnification with the standards for
exculpation from liability).
112. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.52; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (2001).
113. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.57; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a).
114. Bradley & Schipani, supra note 98, at 33.
115. Id. at 32–33; see also Dennis J. Block et al., Indemnification and Insurance of
Corporate Officials, 13 SEC. REG. L.J. 239, 250 (1985) (describing insurance coverage);
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indemnification are inextricably linked because most
corporations can provide full indemnification only if they have
liability insurance that covers those claims.116 The combination of
indemnification provisions and D&O insurance essentially
eliminates directors’ financial liability for breaching their
fiduciary obligations. While insurance in other contexts has the
similar effect of reducing an individual’s financial liability for
improper conduct, typically that individual must pay premiums
and deductibles and thus does not completely escape liability.117
However, the corporate context differs from these other settings
because the corporation—and not individual directors—bears
responsibility for any deductibles and premiums related to that
118
insurance. In this regard, directors truly appear to bear no
costs for liability insurance and the conduct that it covers.
The aforementioned mechanisms result in directors
operating in a regime of nearly complete exoneration for financial
119
liability for breaches of their duty of care. This exoneration is
reflected in the fact that prior to the most recent settlements,
only one case existed in which directors had to pay out of their
own pockets for their misconduct in their roles as directors.120 For
this reason, corporate law appears to provide no significant legal
mechanism for holding directors personally liable for the
increased duties imposed upon them under Sarbanes-Oxley.

Marcia M. McMurray et al., Special Project, Protecting Corporate Directors and Officers:
Insurance and Other Alternatives, 40 VAND. L. REV. 775, 783 (1987) (noting that D&O
insurance covers indemnification payments corporations must make as well as situations
where the corporation cannot or will not indemnify a director).
116. See Slaughter, supra note 97, at 192 (pointing out that a “corporation runs the
risk that the insurer will not reimburse the corporation for payments made according to
expanded indemnity provisions”).
117. See Peter F. Lake, The Special Relationship(s) Between a School and Student:
Law and Policy Ramifications for the Post In Loco Parentis College, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 531,
542–43 (2001) (explaining that insurance law reflects the understanding that some
personal accountability is required or people will “do some very uneconomic and stupid
things”).
118. See Bradley & Schipani, supra note 98, at 32–33 (explaining that insurance
enables corporations to cover directors who they would not have been able to indemnify).
119. See Blair & Stout, supra note 99, at 1791 (“The net result is that, as a practical
matter, a negligent director is more likely to be hit by lightning after leaving her board
meeting than she is to pay damages.”); Kuykendall, supra note 109, at 466 (labeling
directors’ formal insulation from liability under corporate law as the “exoneration canon”).
120. See BLACK, supra note 101, at 6 & tbl.I (pinpointing the absence of cases in this
area).
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Sarbanes-Oxley and Indirect Implications for Director
Liability

Although it seems relatively clear that the Sarbanes-Oxley
legislators made no provisions for director liability, its
requirements nonetheless could have some impact on director
liability. This impact may occur at both the state and federal
levels.121
1. Implications at the State Level. There are some
indications that Sarbanes-Oxley may play a role in reversing the
122
exoneration trend at the state level. Indeed, the passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley has impacted the availability of D&O
123
insurance, which in turn may impact directors’ exposure to
financial liability. Directors’ liability exposure increases if there
is any reduction in D&O insurance. During the 1980s and
specifically after Van Gorkom, insurance premiums rose
dramatically, and it was difficult for some corporations to secure
D&O insurance.124 A similar increase has occurred in the wake of
the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley and litigation surrounding
corporate governance scandals.125 As a result of these events,
some of the largest commercial insurance companies have cut
back on D&O insurance by increasing deductibles and lowering
limits on overall coverage.126 By reducing the availability of D&O

121. See Johnson & Sides, supra note 62, at 1209–12.
122. See, e.g., Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of
Corporate Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625, 641–42 (2004); Sale, supra note 106, at 494–95
123. See Steven R. Smith, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: How Will It Affect D&O
Insurance Coverage?, 91 ILL. B.J. 128, 129 (2003) (cautioning that since Sarbanes-Oxley
was passed, “D&O insurers are taking unprecedented steps to protect themselves against
claims arising out of financial improprieties”).
124. During the 1980s, the availability of D&O insurance was threatened by
increased premiums, making such insurance more costly and decreasing substantive
coverage. See Dennis J. Block et al., Advising Directors on the D&O Insurance Crisis, 14
SEC. REG. L.J. 130, 130–31 (1986) (describing the D&O insurance “crisis” and asserting
that “[p]remiums are skyrocketing, deductibles are increasing at an extraordinary rate,
coverage is shrinking, and more and more insurance companies are terminating their
D&O programs” (footnotes omitted)); Romano, supra note 105, at 1158–59 (noting the
acute insurance crisis from 1985–1987, with some corporations experiencing premium
increases exceeding 200%); Slaughter, supra note 97, at 183–84 (discussing this crisis in
insurance coverage). This crisis escalated after Van Gorkom. See Bradley & Schipani,
supra note 98, at 48 (noting that Van Gorkom was followed by unprecedented increases in
D&O premiums); Romano, supra note 105, at 1159 (stating that “[c]ourts also helped
unsettle the D&O market” in the 1980s).
125. See HAMILTON & MACEY, supra note 98, at 1157 (noting the significant rise in
premiums following the high profile corporate scandals of 2001 and 2002 and the passage
of Sarbanes-Oxley).
126. Porcher L. Taylor III, Commentary, Danger for Directors: Sarbanes-Oxley Act
May Have Diluted the Rule That Generally Bars Courts from Second-Guessing Board
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insurance coverage and simultaneously reducing the
corporation’s ability to provide meaningful indemnification,
Sarbanes-Oxley may serve to increase directors’ exposure to legal
liability. Although relaxed liability exposure through exculpatory
statutes reduces the need for D&O insurance,127 and although
high insurance premiums may eventually level off, SarbanesOxley has at least had a temporary impact on insurance and
hence on director liability.
More significantly, there is evidence that Sarbanes-Oxley
may play a role in increasing director liability by altering the
manner in which state courts view exculpatory statutes.
Recently, Delaware courts have allowed plaintiffs to use the duty
of good faith to avoid both the application of section 102(b)(7) and
a subsequent dismissal of any suit alleging breach of fiduciary
128
duty. At least in Delaware, violations of the duty of good faith
are not covered by the exculpatory statute.129 Thus, directors
cannot rely on the statute to seek dismissal when such a
violation is charged or to avoid personal liability when the

Decisions, 171 N.J. L.J. 1053, 1053 (2003).
127. Bradley & Schipani, supra note 98, at 57.
128. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 286 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(noting that allegations of lack of good faith fall outside of the exculpatory statute and
hence defendants cannot use the statute to seek dismissal of these claims). In Emerald
Partners v. Berlin, the Delaware Supreme Court maintained that when an entire fairness
review was appropriate because of allegations related to a duty of loyalty breach, then
plaintiffs could avoid dismissal. 787 A.2d 85, 93–94 (Del. 2001). The court also stated that
lower courts had to probe the fairness of each of the directors’ duties, including the duty of
care, the duty of good faith, and the duty of loyalty. See id. at 97 (requiring boards to
demonstrate fairness by “present[ing] evidence of the cumulative manner by which [they]
discharge[] all [their] fiduciary duties”). Only after the court determined which of these
duties had been violated could it determine the application of the exculpatory statute. Id.
at 97–98. Although the Delaware Supreme Court later determined that it need not
address the application of the statute because the price was fair and therefore directors
were not liable for monetary damages, the court noted that there were “serious questions
as to the independent directors’ good faith.” Emerald Partners v. Berlin, No. 295, 2003
WL 23019210, at *1 (Del. Dec. 23, 2003). The Delaware Supreme Court clearly seemed to
predicate its discussion on duty of loyalty violations. See Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at
94, 97. However, by requiring courts to review duty of good faith violations once duty of
loyalty violations are established, the court opens the door to two possibilities: First, the
duty of good faith violations will receive heightened, more rigorous review, increasing the
potential that directors will be held liable for such violations. Second, courts will hold
directors liable for breaching their duty of good faith without finding that directors
violated the duty of loyalty. The ultimate result could be that with strong duty of loyalty
allegations, plaintiffs are enabled to make an end-run not only around Delaware’s
exculpatory statute, but also around the business judgment rule’s application to their
duty of good faith claims. In this respect, the Delaware Supreme Court may have paved
the way for increased financial liability based on the directors’ duty of good faith.
129. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). In contrast, the Model Business
Corporation Act does not have an exemption for the duty of good faith. See MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4) (1999).
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violation is proven.130 Delaware courts, particularly the one
involved in the Walt Disney Corporation (“Walt Disney”) dispute,
have suggested that the fiduciary duty of good faith encompasses
a duty to remain informed and to ask appropriate questions of
corporate officers.131 This redefined duty of good faith appears to
include the obligations directors must satisfy under Sarbanes132
Oxley. Thus, by essentially recharacterizing duty of care claims
as breaches of the duty of good faith, Delaware courts may have
discovered a way to impose financial liability on directors who
133
breach their fiduciary duty of attention and inquiry. Of course,
if directors are held liable for violating their duty of good faith,
they can seek indemnification for such liability134 or, if that fails,
135
apply for coverage under their corporation’s D&O insurance.
However, directors may not be able to secure full coverage if
courts subject them to significant liability.136 Indeed, as occurred
in Van Gorkom, the amount of the liability may exceed the
maximum insurance coverage amounts, leaving directors to pay
the remainder.137 This is because as directors’ liability and risk of
liability increase, the cost of insurance should increase, perhaps
making insurance prohibitive for some corporations.138 As the
previous paragraph reveals, such increased cost may represent a
post-Enron reality. Thus, despite the availability of insurance
and indemnification, if courts can impose financial liability on
directors through the good faith exception, then there is a strong

130. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).
131. See Walt Disney, 825 A.2d at 287–89 (noting the failure of directors to pay
attention, ask questions, and review documents during board meetings). Appearing to
approve this characterization of a lack of good faith, the Delaware Supreme Court cited
Walt Disney for the proposition that courts should not condone lax behavior and a “we
don’t care about the risks” attitude. Emerald Partners, No. 295, 2003 WL 23019210, at *1
(Del. Dec. 23, 2003) (citing Walt Disney, 825 A.2d at 289).
132. See supra Part II (discussing standards of conduct imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley).
133. Although the Delaware Chancery Court was careful to emphasize that the
plaintiff shareholders had alleged sufficient facts for a breach of the “obligation to act
honestly and in good faith,” the allegations, including that the directors lacked due care in
the decisionmaking process, appear remarkably similar to duty of care claims. See Walt
Disney, 825 A.2d at 287–89; see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 875 (Del. 1985)
(noting that due care includes a reasonable deliberation when making decisions).
134. See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing how directors can avoid liability by seeking
indemnification).
135. See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing the potential of D&O insurance to completely
eliminate directors’ financial responsibility).
136. See supra notes 123–27 and accompanying text (describing the impact that
Sarbanes-Oxley has had on D&O insurance).
137. See supra note 97 (explaining Van Gorkom directors’ individual responsibility
for damage payments after exhausting corporate insurance).
138. See supra notes 123–24 and accompanying text (explaining increases in D&O
insurance caused by Sarbanes-Oxley).
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likelihood that directors will bear some personal responsibility
for that liability.139
It is noteworthy that Sarbanes-Oxley may have spurred
Delaware’s new stance on exculpatory statutes and director
liability. The mere fact that the Delaware cases enunciating this
new stance were decided post Enron and post Sarbanes-Oxley
may indicate that those events had some impact on the courts’
140
decisions. But there is more. Indeed, shareholders filed their
suit against Walt Disney in January 1997, and the case was
initially dismissed by the Delaware Chancery Court.141 However,
when plaintiffs refiled the suit in January 2002, post Enron and
Sarbanes-Oxley, the Delaware Chancery Court appeared to do an
about-face.142 The court not only showed a willingness to find
breaches of the directors’ fiduciary duty,143 but also found a way
to avoid exoneration by basing allegations related to the breaches
on the duty of good faith.144 More importantly, the Delaware
Supreme Court later cited the Walt Disney decision with
145
approval.
Former Delaware Chancery Court judge William
Allen confirmed the impact that Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley had
on Delaware courts’ willingness to increase directors’ liability in
order to ensure greater adherence to directors’ fiduciary
responsibilities.146 Commenting on the Walt Disney decision, he
noted, “‘It would not be unreasonable to assume that the
Delaware courts are responding to the Enron and WorldCom
headlines and the intrusion, so to speak, of the federal
government into the internal governance of corporations.’”147 Put

139. See Eisenberg, supra note 108, at 1267–68 (noting that the interpretation of the
good faith exception diminishes the protective shield of exculpatory statutes).
140. For example, while Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002, both Emerald
Partners and Walt Disney were decided in 2003. See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of titles 11, 15, 18, 28,
and 29 of the U.S.C.); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2003); In re Walt
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003).
141. See Gunther, supra note 63, at 176 (noting that few people took notice of the
case when it was filed, during a time when “Enron was a hot stock, corporate governance
was a snooze, and no one outside Maryland or Ohio knew Sarbanes or Oxley”).
142. See id. (commenting that “[c]learly, the climate in Delaware has changed”).
143. See Walt Disney, 825 A.2d at 278 (concluding “that plaintiffs’ new complaint
sufficiently pleads a breach of fiduciary duty . . . so as to withstand [defendants’] motion
to dismiss”).
144. See id. at 289 (“Viewed in this light, plaintiffs’ new complaint sufficiently alleges
a breach of the directors’ obligation to act . . . in good faith . . . .”).
145. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, No. 295, 2003 WL 23019210, at *1 n.4 (Del.
Dec. 23, 2003) (quoting Walt Disney’s “we don’t care about the risk” standard).
146. See Gunther, supra note 63, at 176 (discussing Allen’s theories of post-Enron
changes in director liability).
147. Id. (quoting former Chancellor William Allen).
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another way, by the time Walt Disney shareholders refiled their
suit, Sarbanes-Oxley “had put Delaware on the defensive. If the
state was perceived to be doing a less-than-rigorous job of
protecting shareholders, the federal government might take more
responsibility for corporate law, thereby eroding Delaware’s
power.”148 Hence, Sarbanes-Oxley may have caused the Delaware
149
state courts to reverse the exoneration trend.
Of course, whether these hints of reversal will coalesce into
something more remains an open question. Indeed, Delaware
judges have relied on the good faith carve-out embedded in
150
section 102(b)(7) as a foundation for this reversal. However,
other judges appear to question this reliance, strongly
disagreeing with the proposition that the duty of good faith
represents an independent fiduciary duty.151 One Delaware
Chancery Court judge has pointed out, “in my view and the view
of other members of this Court,” the way that section 102(b)(7) is
drafted “balkanizes the fiduciary duty of loyalty” and creates the
confusing idea that the duty of good faith constitutes an
independent duty.152 If this view represents the more dominant
one, then most Delaware courts will continue interpreting
exculpatory statutes in a manner that shields directors from
legal liability. Other judges have urged the Delaware legislature
to take action, stating that “[t]he [Delaware] General Assembly
could contribute usefully to ending the balkanization of the duty
of loyalty by rewriting § 102(b)(7) to make clear that its subparts
all illustrate conduct that is disloyal.”153 Such a rewrite would
ensure that the duty of good faith could not be used as a basis for
challenging conduct representing a breach of a director’s duty of
care, thereby reaffirming the strength of Delaware’s exculpatory
statute in shielding directors from financial liability based on

148. Id.
149. See generally Jones, supra note 122, at 629 (illustrating how Sarbanes-Oxley
has influenced Delaware courts in their move toward a stricter enforcement of fiduciary
duties); Sale, supra note 106, at 494–95 (suggesting the same).
150. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 286 (2003) (analyzing the
good faith “protective ambit” provided by section 102(b)(7)).
151. See Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003) (noting that the
duty of good faith is not an independent fiduciary duty); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, No.
Civ.A. 9700, 2003 WL 21003437, at *39 n.133 (Del. Ch. Apr. 28, 2003) (same), aff’d 840
A.2d 641 (Del. 2003). The notion that the duty of good faith is a separate fiduciary duty
stems not merely from section 102(b)(7), but also from a 1993 Delaware Supreme Court
decision, which enunciated a “triad” of directors’ fiduciary duties, containing the duty of
good faith, loyalty, and due care. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del.
1993).
152. Emerald Partners, 2003 WL 21003437, at *39 n.133.
153. Guttman, 823 A.2d at 506 n.34.
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such a breach. Certainly, the Delaware legislature is free to alter
the statute, and based on its swift implementation of section
102(b)(7) after Van Gorkom,154 one may expect such an alteration
to occur—if court decisions indicate real potential for director
liability. And an alteration may occur all the more swiftly given
the apparent support of Delaware judges.
Notably, the Model Business Corporation Act does not have
an exemption for the duty of good faith.155 Thus, states that have
adopted some version of that Act do not even have the good faith
exemption on which to rely. In this respect, the Delaware
legislature already has a model to follow for eliminating the good
faith exemption, and elimination appears to have the support of
several Delaware judges.156 These facts suggest viewing with
caution the state level trend of undermining the shield against
director liability.
2. Implications at the Federal Level. Possibly more
promising is the impact that Sarbanes-Oxley may have at the
federal level. Indeed, a careful analysis of Sarbanes-Oxley
reveals that it could have an indirect impact on the ability of
shareholders to hold directors personally liable under federal
securities laws. Although one cannot bring a federal securities
law claim against directors based on a breach of their fiduciary
157
there are some circumstances under which federal
duty,
securities laws subject directors to liability for failing to perform
their responsibilities as directors adequately. And although
imposing liability on directors for this failure has proved difficult
in the past, Sarbanes-Oxley may enable plaintiffs to overcome
this difficulty.
Indeed, federal law appears to expose directors to liability
for failing to carry out their monitoring duties. Directors can be
held liable for securities fraud if they sign their corporation’s
annual report with knowledge of its inaccuracies.158 Similarly,

154. See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text (explaining enactment of section
102(b)(7) as a response to Van Gorkom and the insurance crisis).
155. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 2.02(b)(4) (2002).
156. See supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text (noting the responses of various
members or former members of the judiciary).
157. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474–75 (1977) (finding a
breach of fiduciary duty claim insufficient for a securities fraud action); Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 82–84 (1975) (explaining reluctance to imply a federal cause of action when state
law governs directors’ responsibilities).
158. See generally Fairfax, supra note 21, at 18–20 (explaining director and officer
liability for signing annual reports). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has held that a corporate
officer who knowingly signs an inaccurate financial statement can be held liable for
securities fraud. See Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1061–63 (9th Cir. 2000);
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liability can be imposed on directors for their role in the
corporation’s fraud either as the primary perpetrator of the
fraud159 or for controlling an entity found liable for such fraud.160
These kinds of claims implicate the role of directors as corporate
fiduciaries because this type of violation suggests a failure to
monitor the corporation appropriately. For example, to hold a
director liable for signing a fraudulent annual report, plaintiffs
must either prove that the director signed the document despite
knowledge of its fraudulent contents or that the director signed
the document with a reckless disregard of its fraudulent nature
by ignoring red flags.161 Similarly, securities fraud actions
seeking to hold a director liable as a primary violator must
demonstrate that the director either participated in the fraud or
knew or should have known about the fraud and recklessly
disregarded its implications.162 Finally, directors may be subject
to control-person liability only if proven that they knew or should
have known of the existence of fraud within their corporation.163
Because violations can be established by showing that directors

see also Christian J. Mixter, Individual Civil Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws
for Misstatements in Corporate SEC Filings, 56 BUS. LAW. 967, 969–70 (2001) (discussing
the impact of Howard on directors and officers).
159. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), as
amended, and Rule 10b-5 provide that any person can be held liable for making a
material misstatement in connection with a securities transaction. Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000); Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (2004). In Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S.
164, 188–91 (1994), the Supreme Court held that aiders and abettors could not be subject
to liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Id. at 191. Instead, only a primary violator
of those provisions could be held liable for securities fraud. Id.
160. Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act imposes joint and several liability on “every
person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person”—including corporate and
government entities. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78t(a), 78c(a)(9).
161. See Fairfax, supra note 21, at 25–26 & n.114 (citing cases supporting the
position that “officers can be held liable for signing inaccurate Exchange Act reports with
knowledge of the inaccuracy”).
162. See id. at 51–54 (describing the required proof of scienter for securities fraud
violations).
163. Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act provides an affirmative defense for those
control persons who “acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or
acts constituting the violation or cause of action.” 15 U.S.C § 78t(a). Courts have
construed this provision to require that directors did not know or should not have known
of fraudulent activities. See, e.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1302–06 (2d Cir.
1973) (holding that a director is not liable as a control person unless he willfully or
recklessly disregarded the truth); Mader v. Armel, 461 F.2d 1123, 1125–26 (6th Cir. 1972)
(recognizing that a defendant is not liable as a controlling person without evidence that
he knew or should have known of wrongdoing); Hamilton Bank & Trust Co. v. Holliday,
469 F. Supp. 1229, 1243 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (noting that lack of knowledge of
misrepresentations exempts directors from liability as controlling person); Ingenito v.
Bermec Corp., 441 F. Supp. 525, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (noting the importance of knowledge
to the affirmative defense for control persons).
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ignored or disregarded red flags, each of these claims implicate
directors’ obligations to remain informed and ask probing
questions about their corporation’s financial affairs: If it can be
shown that directors should have been aware of fraudulent
activities related to particular corporate transactions because
they had responsibility for knowing about the transactions, then
they can be subject to various federal securities law violations. In
this way, securities law violations implicate directors’ monitoring
duties.
However, securities fraud suits in this area have been
unsuccessful because of the difficulty of proving that directors
had the requisite knowledge to be held liable.164 As the preceding
paragraph demonstrates, actual or constructive knowledge
presents a critical component of federal securities claims
involving director violations. Regarding accounting fraud, for
example, a plaintiff must prove that a director knew or should
have known of the accounting violations related to a specific
transaction and that the director knew or disregarded clear
signals that those violations represented a material
misstatement of the transaction.165 However, establishing this
kind of knowledge represents an almost insurmountable hurdle
because directors are usually not involved in the day-to-day
affairs of the corporation and thus are often unaware of specific
166
transactions and their implications.
Then too, in cases
164. In addition to the difficulties of proving intent, heightened pleading rules in civil
cases also make it difficult to bring actions against directors because the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2000)), requires that plaintiffs allege “with particularity facts giving rise
to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-4(b)(2) (2000). Plaintiffs have found this to be a difficult requirement to meet. See,
e.g., Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 895–98 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that plaintiff’s
complaint, though it contained facts from which scienter could be inferred, did not meet
the threshold imposed by Congress); Ronconi v. Larkin, 253 F.3d 423, 429–32 (9th Cir.
2001) (holding plaintiff failed to allege “specific ‘contemporaneous statements or
conditions’” that would give rise to the “strong inference” of scienter necessary to sustain
a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 78(u)-4(b)(2) (citations omitted)).
165. See, e.g., In re Fine Host Corp. Sec. Litig., 25 F. Supp. 2d 61, 69 (D. Conn. 1998)
(requiring a complaint involving accounting fraud to allege that the defendant was aware
of false or misleading numbers and that she “deliberately avoided checking into the
numbers because she suspected them to be false or misleading”).
166. See Elizabeth Amon, White Collar Crime: Heat Going Up? It’s Tough to
Prosecute CEOs—For Now, NAT’L L.J., July 8, 2002, at A15 (citing Assistant U.S.
Attorney and chief of New Jersey’s Securities Fraud Unit John Carrey as noting that
“often there are a few e-mails or memos that can prove a CEO [had] knowledge about
illegal accounting practices”); Jennifer Arlen, Commentary, Forget New Laws—Fix the
Old Ones, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 2002, at B13 (noting that “[i]t is very difficult to
prove . . . intent to defraud”); Jim Oliphant, Throwing CEOs in Jail No Easy Job, LEGAL
TIMES, July 15, 2002, at 1, 14 (noting that “the higher up someone is, the harder it is to
charge them” because they are “often removed from the day-to-day operations” of their
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involving financial fraud, such as Enron, establishing director
knowledge proves challenging because violations are often buried
in complex financial statements.167 For this reason, it is very rare
for directors to face personal liability under federal securities
laws. In fact, case law suggests that such liability cannot be
imposed unless directors have a duty to monitor specific
transactions and hence a duty to be aware of misleading
information regarding those transactions.168 Thus, in their most
recent study, Professors Black, Cheffins, and Klausner found no
federal securities cases in which outside directors were held
personally liable.169
Sarbanes-Oxley imposes specific duties to monitor various
transactions and thus may increase the ability of plaintiffs to
170
First,
hold directors liable under federal securities laws.
directors who serve on the audit committee of their corporation
should have greater awareness about the financial affairs of the
corporation because they not only have primary responsibility for
the flow of financial information, but also must oversee
disagreements related to that information and employee
complaints regarding accounting and auditing irregularities.171
Second, these audit committee directors should also have a
heightened awareness of any accounting and auditing
irregularities because they must receive reports about significant
172
defects in the internal control procedures. Finally, depending
on the procedure that the specific corporation adopts, either the
directors who serve on the QLCC or the entire board should know
about evidence related to material securities fraud or fiduciary
duty violations.173 Thus, Sarbanes-Oxley specifically ensures that

companies).
167. See Arianne Lavell et al., Payback Time? Seeking Retribution for Enron’s Losses
Won’t Be Easy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 11, 2002, at 36 (quoting a former federal
prosecutor who explains that proof of fraud is often “buried in documents—sometimes
hundreds of thousands of documents”).
168. See, e.g., In re Xerox Corp. Sec. Litig., 165 F. Supp. 2d 208, 215–16 (D. Conn.
2001) (noting that recklessness can be demonstrated by showing that a defendant “failed
to review or check information that they had a duty to monitor, or ignored obvious signs of
fraud”).
169. BLACK ET AL., supra note 101, at 34.
170. See supra Part II (discussing how Sarbanes-Oxley appears to federalize
directors’ fiduciary duty to closely monitor audits).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 34–35 (discussing how Sarbanes-Oxley
imposes responsibilities on directors to oversee and remain informed about auditor’s
financial work and related disagreement).
172. See supra text accompanying note 41.
173. See supra notes 45–57 and accompanying text (explaining that under SarbanesOxley the corporation’s entire board or QLCC receives evidence of securities fraud or
fiduciary duty breaches from attorneys appearing or practicing before the SEC).
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the board or the audit committee should be made aware of illegal
behavior as well as evidence that might establish illegal
behavior. By increasing directors’ obligations in these various
ways, Sarbanes-Oxley increases our expectations about their
general and specific knowledge of corporate affairs and
misconduct. These increased expectations may make it harder for
directors to deny awareness of financial irregularities in reports
they sign or companies they oversee. Even when directors have
no actual knowledge of irregularities, Sarbanes-Oxley implies
that they should. In this respect, Sarbanes-Oxley may increase
the chances of directors being held personally liable under
federal law for failing to remain properly informed.
Then too, similar to its impact at the state level, SarbanesOxley and the general dissatisfaction with director conduct that
it symbolizes may give shareholders the political clout they need
to ensure that directors face personal liability in federal
securities class-action settlements. Indeed, prior to Enron,
directors rarely faced personal liability even when shareholder
class-action suits were settled for monetary damages.174 Instead,
insurance most often served to insulate directors from liability.
However, directors at Enron and WorldCom recently agreed to be
personally liable for portions of shareholder settlements:175 A
group of former Enron directors agreed to pay $13 million of their
own money in connection with a $168 million settlement, and ten
former directors of WorldCom agreed to pay $18 million of their
own money as part of a $54 million settlement.176 It is noteworthy
that directors agreed to these settlements despite the fact that
judges had already dismissed shareholder suits against them
because of their lack of requisite intent under federal securities
177
laws. Shareholders’ insistence that directors remain part of the
settlement suggests their desire to hold these directors

174. See BLACK ET AL., supra note 101, at 2 (noting prior to the Enron and WorldCom
settlements that “[t]o our knowledge, no outside director of a public company has paid
out-of-pocket for either damages or legal expenses under securities law, ever”). In their
study, Professors Black, Cheffins, and Klausner reviewed cases involving outside
directors of public companies from 1968 to the present and found no cases in which actual
liability had been imposed. Id. In the few securities cases in which directors paid modest
settlement fees, the directors were indemnified. See id. at 6.
175. See White, supra note 4.
176. Id.
177. See Kurt Eichenwald, Enron’s Outside Directors Win a Round in Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2003, at C6 (reporting that the case was dismissed because “the plaintiffs
failed to demonstrate that the board members knew about any wrongdoing”); see also In
re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 258 F. Supp. 2d 576, 624, 627, 649 (S.D.
Tex. 2003) (dismissing claims against directors).
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personally accountable,178 while directors’ willingness to face such
personal liability may reflect an increased federal pressure to
obtain better director accountability embodied at least in the
spirit of Sarbanes-Oxley.
This increase in the potential for director liability at the
federal level is especially significant given the greater certainty
and severity of penalties in this area. Indeed, Sarbanes-Oxley
increased the penalties for violations of securities fraud from ten
to twenty years in prison and from one to five million dollars in
179
Moreover, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (the
fines.
“Guidelines”) ensure that when directors are found liable for such
transgressions, they will be required to serve at least a minimum
prison sentence and to pay a criminal fine.180 With respect to
financial liability, the SEC has taken the position that states
cannot indemnify directors for violations of federal securities
laws.181 Courts stress that such a position reflects the SEC’s view
that indemnification will undermine the deterrence goals of
182
federal securities laws. Then too, because it is a federal claim,
state exculpatory statutes are inapplicable.183 Thus, even though

178. See White, supra note 4 (reporting that a WorldCom shareholder desired to hold
directors personally liable to send a deterrent message).
179. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 1106, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (Supp. II 2002).
180. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law
in Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937, 941–42 (2003) (describing the impact
of federal sentencing guidelines on white collar criminal penalties). In an apparent
reversal of its earlier decision upholding the constitutionality of the Guidelines, see
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374, 389–91, 398–99, 412 (1989), the Supreme
Court has recently called into question the constitutionality of the Guidelines, see Blakely
v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2538 & n.9 (2004) (declaring Washington State’s
sentencing guidelines unconstitutional but refusing to discuss the similar Federal
Sentencing Guidelines). This could have significant repercussions for both the severity
and certainty of all federal sentences.
181. See Commodity and Security Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.510, 229.512(h)(3)
(2000) (explaining how the indemnification of directors for liability arising under the
Securities Act “is against public policy . . . and is therefore unenforceable”). While this
position is expressed in connection with the Securities Act, it has been interpreted to
apply to the Exchange Act as well. See Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 334–35 (7th
Cir. 1979) (expanding the SEC position against indemnification to section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act). In addition, most cases agree with the SEC’s position. See Ross, 601 F.2d
at 334 (noting that several courts have held that indemnification is not available in
securities cases); see also JOSEPH WARREN BISHOP, JR., THE LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS
AND DIRECTORS: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE § 6.16 (Supp. 2004); Alan Applebaum
& Robert A. McDowell, Indemnification Against Securities Acts Liabilities, 27 BUS. LAW.
131, 134, 137 (1972); David B. Schulz, Indemnification of Directors and Officers Against
Liabilities Imposed Under Federal Securities Laws, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 1043, 1057–58
(1995).
182. See Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969)
(observing “that to tolerate indemnity . . . would encourage flouting the policy of the
common law and the Securities Act”).
183. See Frank Balotti & Mark Gentile, Elimination of Limitation of Director
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their behavior appears similar to a violation of fiduciary law,
directors cannot make use of many of the state mechanisms that
shield them from personal liability. In this respect, SarbanesOxley’s federalization of fiduciary duties and the liability
associated therewith may represent a significant departure from
the exoneration trend.
And yet there is reason for skepticism about the
completeness of this departure. Indeed, while the SEC appears
hostile to corporate indemnification efforts, the SEC has not
expressed a similar hostility towards D&O insurance.184 Thus,
corporations can continue to shield directors from liability
through such insurance. The strength of this shield may depend
on shareholders’ individual efforts. Indeed, although insurance
proceeds were used to pay some portion of the Enron and
WorldCom settlements, both settlement agreements apparently
were structured so that the insurance liability was exhausted;
hence, directors were forced to bear some personal liability.185 It
is too soon to determine if shareholders will continue to ensure
that directors do not take advantage of insurance. More
importantly, the Supreme Court has indicated a reluctance to
hold corporate officials federally liable for actions that essentially
amount to breach of fiduciary duty claims.186 According to the
Court, “Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors
commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding
that, except where federal law expressly requires certain
responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state
law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation.”187
Certainly, Sarbanes-Oxley does impose express responsibilities
on directors188 and thus, consistent with the Supreme Court’s
pronouncement, suggests that courts should provide some federal
Liability for Delaware Corporations, 12 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 5, 13 (1987) (noting that
section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation statute excludes violations for state
or federal securities laws).
184. Rule 461(c) of the Securities Act provides that “[i]nsurance against liabilities
arising under the [Securities] Act, whether the cost of insurance is borne by the
registrant, the insured or some other person, will not be considered a bar to
acceleration . . . .” 17 C.F.R. § 230.461(c) (2004).
185. See White, supra note 4 (discussing the details of the settlements).
186. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84–85 (1975) (noting that a cause of action for
breach of fiduciary duty may arise out of a federal law violation depending on the state
law that governs corporate internal affairs and further stating that “[w]e are necessarily
reluctant to imply a federal right to recover funds used in violation of a federal statute
where the laws governing the corporation may put a shareholder on notice that there may
be no such recovery”).
187. Id. at 84 (emphasis added).
188. See supra notes 64–71 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements that
sections 305 and 306 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act impose upon directors).
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remedy for breaches of those responsibilities. However,
Sarbanes-Oxley’s failure to provide some express remedy for
directors’ violations of their responsibilities may be viewed as a
signal of Congress’s intention to leave any remedy to state law.
That signal may be supported by the fact that Congress has
provided an express remedy for officers who violate their new
responsibilities.189 In this regard, Congress’s failure to impose
some specific liability on directors, when viewed in contrast with
their treatment of CEOs and CFOs, may undermine efforts to
hold directors liable at the federal level by suggesting that
Congress did not intend such liability to be conferred under
federal law.
Ultimately, therefore, it is unclear whether indirect
measures at the state and federal level will increase the
possibility that directors face legal liability for failing to perform
their fiduciary responsibilities under Sarbanes-Oxley. Certainly,
given the Act’s apparent purposeful exclusion of director liability,
if any such increase arises, it probably will be unintentional.
Moreover, there remains uncertainty regarding whether these
indirect measures will prove sufficient to undermine the shield
protecting directors from legal liability. In this regard, SarbanesOxley’s failure to contain a provision specifically imposing legal
liability on directors may ensure a continuation of the status quo.
The next Part will address the consequences of such
continuation.
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF SPARING THE ROD ON DIRECTOR
BEHAVIOR
If Sarbanes-Oxley does not open the door to imposing
liability on corporate directors, what difference does it make on
directors’ fidelity to their obligations? Many corporate scholars
would argue that it makes very little difference190 and hence
would view with approval Sarbanes-Oxley’s reiteration of the
status quo with respect to director liability. This Part examines
the primary arguments against director liability. On the one
hand, some scholars argue that legal sanctions may be neither
necessary (because of extra-legal factors that shape director
conduct) nor effective in constraining director behavior.191 On the
other hand, even scholars who do not negate the impact of legal

189. See supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text (citing the penalties that the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposes upon officers who breach their duty).
190. See infra notes 193, 195 (questioning deterrence value of legal penalties).
191. See infra Part III.A.
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sanctions argue that we should prefer extra-legal sanctions
because the cost of legal liability is too high.192 This Part
demonstrates the defects in these arguments, suggesting several
reasons why we should be wary of Sarbanes-Oxley’s apparent
refusal to impose legal liability on directors.
A.

. . . Ashes, Ashes, They All Fall Down: The Failings of
Extra-Legal Measures

Many scholars maintain that legal sanctions are not
necessary to regulate director conduct because other extra-legal
forces ensure that directors comply with their fiduciary
obligations.193 Specifically, both reputational sanctions and the
capital market pressure directors to act in the best interests of
the corporation and its shareholders.194 Of course, the very
existence of Enron and other corporate scandals reveals the
imperfections in the ability of these external measures to prevent
director irresponsibility. These imperfections in turn undermine
the rationale for rejecting legal sanctions as a means of shaping
director behavior.
First, many scholars insist that we need not impose legal
sanctions on directors because their desire to maintain a positive
reputation encourages them to perform their fiduciary
195
responsibilities with the appropriate level of diligence. Board
members, particularly outside board members, often hold
prestigious positions within their respective business,
government, and academic communities. For example, the chair
of Enron’s audit committee was a professor emeritus of

192. See infra Part III.B.
193. See David M. Phillips, Principles of Corporate Governance: A Critique of Part IV,
52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 653, 673 (1984) (noting that extra-legal incentives regulate
conduct and make legal regulation undesirable); see also BLACK ET AL., supra note 101, at
43, 48 (pointing to other extra-legal incentives that regulate director conduct including
monitoring by D&O insurers and directors’ sense of professionalism).
194. See BLACK ET AL., supra note 101, at 44–48 (noting that concern for their
reputation represents a key element of directors’ incentives to perform their duties
appropriately); Phillips, supra note 193, at 673–83 (suggesting that the market affects
corporate behavior).
195. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications
of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative
Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 718 (1986) (noting that even without sanctions,
settlements do significant damage to reputations, and the fear of such damage constrains
director behavior); Eisenberg, supra note 108, at 1265 (noting that directors’ adherence to
their duty of care is driven largely by social norms, which depends on reputation, rather
than the threat of liability); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 675 (1984)
(discussing the reputation concerns of managers, promoters, accountants, and investment
bankers in disclosure situations).
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accounting and the former dean of the Stanford University
Graduate School of Business.196 Other outside directors included
three CEOs of corporations, one president and one former
president of M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, and a former U.K.
Secretary of State for Energy and Leader of the Houses of
Commons and Lords.197 As members of these various
communities, directors have strong incentives to perform their
duties in a manner that does not damage their reputation within
these communities.198 Then too, some board members hold
199
multiple directorships. Indeed, most of Enron’s board members
served as directors on other corporation’s boards.200 Because
directors’ conduct on one board could have repercussions for their
service on other boards, directors have an interest in ensuring
that their specific reputation as a director remains unblemished.
Directors’ desire to protect their specific and general reputation
should compel them to behave appropriately: Directors’ failure to
adequately meet their responsibilities may undermine their
reputation, not only causing them to lose their seat as a board
member, but also damaging their reputation in the larger
community.201 In this way, the threat of reputational sanctions
should be an ideal method of ensuring that directors fulfill their
fiduciary obligations, thereby making legal sanctions
unnecessary.
Another argument used to reject the need for legal sanctions
focuses on the regulating force of the capital market. Scholars
maintain that the capital market effectively regulates corporate
conduct by deterring directors from taking actions (or failing to
take actions) that adversely affect their corporations’ stock
202
price. Under this theory, when corporate officers and directors
196. See 2001 Proxy Statement of Enron Corp. at 5 (as filed with the SEC on March
27, 2001) [hereinafter Enron Proxy Statement] (listing biographical information on Enron
director Robert K. Jaedicke), available at http://budurtha.georgetown.edu/enron/Proxy2001_March_27.htm.
197. See id. at 4–7.
198. See, e.g., Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72
S. CAL. L. REV. 959, 966–68 (1999) (noting the significance of reputation for corporate
officers and directors).
199. See Lisa DiCarlo, Corporate Governance: America’s Most Overworked Directors,
FORBES.COM, Aug. 6, 2002, at http://www.forbes.com/2002/08/06/0806directors.html
(showing that although most outside directors serve on only one board, 807 directors of
S&P 500 companies serve on two or more boards).
200. See Enron Proxy Statement, supra note 196, at 2–5.
201. See supra notes 193, 195 (describing the impact of reputational sanctions on
directors).
202. See Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV.
1259, 1263–64 (1982) (explaining the regulatory impact of markets, direct monitoring,
and legal rules on management interests); Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in
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fail to behave responsibly, thereby engaging in conduct that
harms shareholders and their profits, the harm is reflected in
lowered stock prices.203 The more harmful the conduct, the more
devastating the impact it will have on a corporation’s bottom
line.204 These lowered stock prices negatively impact a corporation
in a multitude of ways.205 Indeed, low stock prices not only serve
to repel potential investors, but also can lead existing
shareholders to sell their interests in the corporation. Moreover,
poor stock prices may decrease a corporation’s credit rating,
206
making it more difficult or costly to secure credit financing.
Then too, low stock prices make it difficult for corporations to
raise capital by hosting a public offering.207 Low stock prices also
may make a corporation vulnerable to takeover attempts,
potentially jeopardizing the positions of officers and directors.208
Directors who seek to avoid lowered stock prices and their
negative consequences will not engage in the harmful conduct
that can trigger a decline in stock prices. Theoretically, the
market’s ability to regulate director conduct in this manner
negates the need for legal sanctions.
Unfortunately, neither the market nor the threat of
reputational damages fulfilled their regulatory function for
Enron or WorldCom directors, discrediting the notion that the
existence of such measures obviates the need for legal sanctions.
Certainly, the repercussions these directors faced appear to

the Last Period of Play, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1937 (2003) (noting that corporate
officers and directors are constrained by various markets); Paredes, supra note 19, at 523
(noting the markets’ impact on corporate governance); Phillips, supra note 193, at 673–83
(emphasizing the impact of markets on corporate behavior). Other markets, including the
products and labor markets, also serve to regulate corporate conduct. See Griffith, supra,
at 1937 (noting nonjudicial constraints on management that include product, capital,
labor, and corporate control markets); Paredes, supra note 19, at 523 (observing that
product, capital, management, and corporate control markets serve to regulate conduct);
Phillips, supra note 193, at 673 (noting the role of securities, executive employment, and
products markets as regulators of managerial behavior). Because it is most relevant, this
Article only discusses the impact of the securities market on corporate conduct.
203. Phillips, supra note 193, at 673.
204. See id. at 673–75 (hypothesizing that “[b]oth equity and debt securities prices
should suffer,” making it difficult for “the corporation to repay its debt”).
205. Id. at 674–75.
206. Griffith, supra note 202, at 1937–38 (emphasizing that misbehavior will
decrease access to capital markets and make firms unable to raise debt financing at
competitive rates).
207. See id. at 1937–38 (commenting that a firm’s misbehavior makes raising equity
difficult).
208. See Phillips, supra note 193, at 678–80 (suggesting that low stock prices
increase the likelihood that a corporation will be targeted for a takeover); Ribstein, supra
note 34, at 7–8 (positing that the market develops mechanisms such as hostile takeovers
to eliminate managers that perform poorly).
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represent an eloquent demonstration of the damaging impact
directors’ misconduct can have on their reputations, seeming to
validate the importance of reputational sanctions. Indeed, all of
the Enron board members present during the company’s collapse
felt the need to resign their positions at Enron.209 Moreover,
several institutional shareholders and watchdog groups have
begun pressuring other public companies with Enron board
members not to renominate or reelect ex-Enron directors.210 In
the wake of this kind of pressure, many Enron directors have
voluntarily resigned from their board positions at other
companies.211 Some investor groups also have asked the SEC to
impose lifetime bans on these directors, indicating that the
212
damage to their reputations as directors may be irreparable. As
one Columbia University professor explained, “Anyone who sat
on Enron’s board as the company unraveled could find
213
themselves persona non grata.” In this respect, Enron reveals
the damage that can occur to a director’s position and status in
the community when she is perceived to have behaved
irresponsibly. Unfortunately, the Enron directors’ apparent
acquiescence in corporate misconduct reveals that the possibility
of such damage was not enough to compel directors to perform

209. See Carrie Johnson, After Enron, a New Focus on Boards: Case Spawns a
Number of Reform Proposals, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2002, at E1 [hereinafter Johnson, After
Enron] (noting that as of March 8, 2002, only half of Enron’s board members remained);
Johnson, supra note 30 (reporting that, as of July 7, 2002, all Enron board members had
resigned).
210. See Johnson, After Enron, supra note 209 (noting the AFL-CIO’s “campaign to
prevent Enron directors from serving on other boards”); Matt Krantz & Noelle Knox,
Some Enron Board Members Leave Other Firm’s Rosters, USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 2002, at
1B (referring to the New York City Pension Funds and Retirement System’s plan to
persuade six companies not to renominate Enron board members); Louis Lavelle, Enron
Directors: Unfit to Serve Anywhere?, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Feb. 12, 2002, at http://www.
businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/feb2002/nf20020212_1828.htm (pointing out that the
“AFL-CIO has called on the 20 public companies where . . . Enron directors still hold
board seats . . . not to nominate those directors for new terms,” while another watchdog
group pushed for directors to resign from posts on the governing boards of Harvard
University and Qualcomm).
211. See Krantz & Knox, supra note 210 (reporting the voluntary resignations of
several Enron board members from other board rooms); Lavelle, supra note 210 (noting,
among others, the voluntary resignation of Kenneth Lay, former chairman of Enron’s
board, from his position at Enron as well as three other positions that he held, and the
resignation of Enron’s chair of the audit committee from his board positions); Dan O’Shea,
Ex-Enron Director Leaves Qualcomm Post, INSIGHT, May 18, 2004, 2004 WL 79648524
(reporting the resignation of Enron director Frank Savage from Qualcomm despite his reelection and implying that the resignation may have resulted from pressure by outside
groups).
212. See Lavelle, supra note 210 (noting the AFL-CIO request, as well as more than
forty individual shareholder requests, for such bans).
213. See Krantz & Knox, supra note 210 (quoting Professor Robert Bontempo).
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their responsibilities in a more diligent manner. Hence,
reputation-based sanctions appeared to have failed in their
primary goal of curbing the director misbehavior that contributed
to Enron and other instances of corporate malfeasance.214
Similarly, Enron appears to be an example of market
215
failure. Indeed, market-based regulation depends on harmful
conduct being reflected in lowered stock prices, and in the case of
Enron, this reflection did not occur.216 Instead, despite the fact
that Enron managers engaged in conduct detrimental to
shareholders and the corporation, market watchers continued to
issue buy orders for Enron stock almost right up until the
217
corporation declared bankruptcy. In this way, the market failed
to reflect the harmful conduct of its directors and managers until
it was too late. From this perspective, because the market failed
to provide signals of corporate misconduct through lowered stock
prices, it failed as a means of regulating that conduct.218
The inability of market and reputational forces to ensure
appropriate board behavior suggests the necessity of legal
sanctions. As Part II revealed, the legal regime under which the
directors in Enron operated carried little if any threat of legal
liability for directors’ failure to perform their fiduciary
219
obligations. In that sense, the regime relied completely on
extra-legal sanctions to regulate director behavior. This reliance
proved inadvisable, highlighting the potential necessity of legal
sanctions as a component of the corporate governance system.
B. Reexamining the Utility of Legal Sanctions
While scholars acknowledge that Enron demonstrated the
failure of extra-legal measures, they express doubt about the

214. This Article does not deny the fact that reputational sanctions may represent an
appropriate method of punishing directors and that such sanctions may serve as a future
deterrent for other directors. However, it does assert that these sanctions did not serve to
deter the specific misconduct at issue in Enron and many other corporations involved in
corporate malfeasance.
215. See Ribstein, supra note 34, at 53 (arguing that “[c]orporate frauds . . . were
facilitated because there was too much investor confidence”).
216. See id.; Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure,
and Enron, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 394, 417–18 (2004) (observing that “[s]ecurities markets
function efficiently when share price fully reflects information about the issuer” but that
“Enron’s collapse casts some serious doubts on the efficiency of the market”).
217. See Macey, supra note 216, at 403–04; David Millon, Who “Caused” the Enron
Debacle, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 309, 321–23 (2003).
218. See Ribstein, supra note 34, at 53–54 (commenting on the market signals
failure).
219. See supra Part II.
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ability of legal measures to curb director irresponsibility.220 On
the one hand, these critics argue that the nature of director
behavior makes it difficult to deter this irresponsible behavior
221
through legal sanctions. On the other hand, the critics argue
that evidence of legal sanctions’ ability to deter illegal behavior is
relatively weak and thus legal sanctions cannot be relied on to
222
shape director behavior. This subpart reveals the flaws in both
of these arguments.
Economic theory, particularly the rational choice theory,
suggests that significant legal penalties in the form of financial
sanctions or incarceration are a powerful source of deterrence
because they make the costs of illegal behavior outweigh the
223
Because the theory works best when applied to
benefits.
individuals who can assess rationally the costs and benefits of
their actions, many scholars presume that the theory has
particular applicability to those who might engage in “white
collar”224 crime, including directors who engage in planning,
225
deliberation, and risk assessment. The economic theory also

220. See Moohr, supra note 180, at 968, 973–74 (suggesting a “wholesale failure of
every monitor,” but deemphasizing the role of criminal penalties); Paredes, supra note 19,
at 523–26 (expressing a preference for a market-based response); Ribstein, supra note 34,
at 47–48 (noting a preference for market-based regulations despite its flaws and pointing
out that “it was markets and not regulators that uncovered the problems”).
221. See, e.g., Moohr, supra note 180, at 961 (“Unless individuals recognize that
proposed conduct triggers criminal sanctions, they will not pause to evaluate the risk of
detection and punishment.”).
222. See, e.g., John Braithwaite & Toni Makkai, Testing an Expected Utility Model of
Corporate Deterrence, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 7, 29–35 (1991) (concluding from study results
that “there is little warrant for accepting the deterrence hypotheses”). In a study of 410
managers of Australian nursing homes, the authors found that most sanction threats did
not have the expected deterrent effect. See id. at 17, 31 (“When considering [serious]
deterrent threats . . . once the expected disutility of punishment passes a certain
threshold, further increases make little difference.”).
223. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law
as Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 5, 10–11 (explaining that a person will
“decide to engage in the activity only if the benefits she receives exceed the external
costs”); accord Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 1193, 1195 (1985) (arguing that the “threat of punishing attempts [at
crime] . . . makes the completed crime more costly in an expected sense and therefore less
likely to be committed”).
224. The term “white collar crime” was coined by Edwin H. Sutherland, who defined
it as a crime “committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course
of his occupation.” EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 9 (1949).
225. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency
of Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295, 1325 (2001) (noting the applicability of
deterrence theory to corporate crime); Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use
of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 425–26,
443 (1963) (suggesting that corporate criminals whose crimes are “calculated and
deliberate” are easily deterred by the possibility of corporate stigma); Moohr, supra note
180, at 957–58 (explaining that the rational choice theory resonates in the area of
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has particular relevance for individuals because they are not
committed to a life of crime and consequently will abandon
improper behavior if the costs of that behavior prove too high.226
Thus, economic theory suggests that legal sanctions may be
exactly what the corporate governance system needs in order to
ensure that directors carry out their responsibilities faithfully.
1. Legal Sanctions and the Nature of Director Misconduct.
Some scholars question the applicability of the economic theory,
and specifically the rational choice theory, to director conduct.
The rational choice theory presupposes that actors can
distinguish between legal and illegal behavior and make a choice
about the behavior in which they will engage based on that
227
distinction. However, if the law does not clearly define the kind
of conduct considered illegal, then the rational choice theory can
no longer be applied because a “choice” regarding whether or not
to engage in illegal conduct cannot be made.228 This effect may be
the case with regard to directors. Indeed, scholars note that our
corporate regime does not accurately define the kind of director
conduct considered to be a violation of a director’s duty.229
Instead, the parameters of these violations are vague and
230
“famously written in shades of gray.” Even though directors
should understand that, based on existing case law, failing to pay
sufficient attention to corporate actions or to ask the appropriate
number of questions regarding corporate transactions represents
a breach of their fiduciary responsibilities,231 this general
understanding falls short of pinpointing the specific conduct that

business crime because these crimes require advance planning, which allows one to assess
the risk of detection and punishment).
226. See William J. Chambliss, Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness of Legal
Sanctions, 1967 WIS. L. REV. 703, 709–10 (concluding that “[w]here penal sanctions are
imposed there is a decline in the propensity to violate the law”); Kadish, supra note 225,
at 434 (“[T]he corporate stigma may operate as a deterrent by impairing the reputation of
the corporation . . . and hence adversely affecting its economic position.”); see also John
Braithwaite & Gilbert Geis, On Theory and Action for Corporate Crime Control, 28 CRIME
& DELINQ. 292, 300–02 (1982) (positing that white collar offenders are more easily
deterred because they are not committed to a life of crime).
227. See Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, Sanction Threats and Appeals to
Morality: Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 549,
550–56 (1996) (explaining assumptions upon which the rational choice model is based).
228. See Moohr, supra note 180, at 960 (arguing that “if individuals do not realize
that their conduct is criminal or even borders on it, they will not engage in a rational
calculation”).
229. See id. at 960–61 (“[S]uch laws fail to provide notice that certain conduct is
criminal.”).
230. Id. at 959.
231. See supra notes 15–18 (discussing cases detailing breaches of fiduciary duty).
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triggers such a breach.232 For example, will a director be liable for
breaching her duty of attention by failing to attend one board
meeting? What if the director attends every board meeting, but
asks no questions? If the director does ask questions, how many
questions will be sufficient to satisfy her fiduciary obligations?
That case law provides no definite answers to these questions
makes it difficult for directors to assess the appropriateness of
their conduct, and thus poses a problem for any deterrence
theory of liability based on the rational choice model. From this
perspective, the rational choice theory is ill-suited as a
justification for imposing legal sanctions on directors.
This perspective, however, overemphasizes directors’
inability to distinguish between legal and illegal conduct. In fact,
some cases do provide greater substance and specificity with
respect to the kinds of behavior that violate a director’s fiduciary
responsibility.233 At least one case explains that the failure to
review any financial statements or to have a rudimentary
234
understanding of corporate affairs subjects one to liability.
Similarly, approving a merger without reviewing and
understanding the specific financial information on which the
235
merger price was based will subject directors to liability.
Then too, many self-regulating agencies have issued
corporate governance principles aimed at creating greater
236
specificity regarding the proper conduct for corporate actors.
Most notably, the Business Roundtable, an association of
CEOs from top corporations, has published Principles of
Corporate Governance, a publication detailing the elements of
acceptable board behavior.237 The Business Roundtable
requires directors to have an attitude of “constructive
skepticism” pursuant to which they must both understand the
substance of all reports and “ask questions and obtain
answers” about the process used by managers to reach

232. See Moohr, supra note 180, at 960 (highlighting the point that laws are “written
in nonspecific, general terms”).
233. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 864 (Del. 1985) (holding directors
responsible for uninformed business judgments, ineffectual curative actions, and lack of
candor with stockholders); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (N.J. 1981)
(defining with specificity conduct required of directors such as regular attendance at
board meetings).
234. See Francis, 432 A.2d at 821–22.
235. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 881.
236. See generally Business Roundtable, supra note 12 (outlining a complete
corporate governance system).
237. See id. at 10–29.
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important decisions.238 With regard to financial matters, the
Business Roundtable states the following:
[T]he board, through its audit committee, should have a
broad understanding of the corporation’s financial
statements, including why the accounting principles critical
to the corporation’s business were chosen, what key
judgments and estimates were made by management, and
how the choice of principles, and the making of such
judgments and estimates, impacts the reported financial
239
results of the corporation.
The existence of these kinds of statements undermines the
notion that directors lack guidance regarding the appropriate
boundaries of their behavior. In addition, the vast majority of
corporations have adopted codes of conduct or ethics, outlining
240
the kinds of behavior that satisfy a director’s fiduciary duty.
These codes include provisions regarding the manner in which
directors should review and oversee corporate affairs and
241
financial operations. Indeed, investigations reveal that Enron
had adopted such a code and that Enron directors violated it
repeatedly.242 And even if these codes are unclear, SarbanesOxley’s provision involving directors adds even greater specificity
to directors’ duties.243
These varied statements addressing director conduct
undermine the suggestion that corporations and other entities
fail to provide sufficient detail regarding the manner in which

238. Id. at 3–4.
239. Id. at 5.
240. See, e.g., Center for Business Ethics, Are Corporations Institutionalizing
Ethics?, 5 J. BUS. ETHICS 85, 85–86 (1986) (stating that almost eighty percent of the 279
Fortune 500 companies reviewed reported taking at least preliminary steps to
“incorporate ethical values . . . into [their organizations’] daily operations”); Harvey L. Pitt
& Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second
Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1602 n.257 (1990) (noting that
94.7% of companies surveyed in a 1987 Georgetown study had adopted codes of conduct);
Bernard J. White & B. Ruth Montgomery, Corporate Codes of Conduct, 23 CAL. MGMT.
REV. 80, 82 (1980) (reporting that seventy-seven percent of companies had codes of
conduct in 1979); Carolyn Wiley, The ABC’s of Business Ethics: Definitions, Philosophies
and Implementation, INDUS. MGMT., Jan.–Feb. 1995, at 22, 24 (reporting that ninety
percent of Fortune 500 companies and about half of other companies have adopted codes
of conduct).
241. See White & Montgomery, supra note 240, at 84–85 (detailing the subjects
addressed by the codes sampled).
242. See Powers Report, supra note 22, at 28, 46–47, 77 (noting the board’s failure to
comply with Enron’s Code of Conduct); see also O’Connor, supra note 20, at 1236–37
(commenting that Enron “followed many of the best practices for good corporate
governance”).
243. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2002) (outlining, for example,
duties regarding financial reports).

(3)FAIRFAXG2

2005]

5/21/2005 1:23 PM

SPARE THE ROD

437

directors should comply with their responsibilities.244 Rather,
they suggest that directors understand their responsibilities but
choose to ignore them, which certainly appears to be the case
with Enron directors. Directors’ decisions to ignore their
obligations not only reveal that they can make a choice about
their conduct (thus validating the application of the rational
choice theory to their conduct), but also that an additional
mechanism may be needed to ensure that the choice directors
make is the correct one.
2. Legal Sanctions and Their Deterrent Value. Of course,
some scholars argue that legal liability cannot be that
mechanism. These scholars question the ability of legal sanctions
to deter illegal behavior generally and director misconduct
specifically. Admittedly, there is some empirical data suggesting
245
that legal sanctions have very little deterrent value. More
specifically, the existence of a large body of legal sanctions during
the Enron debacle suggests their failure to impact director
behavior. Indeed, there are allegations that some Enron directors
may have violated several laws in existence prior to SarbanesOxley.246 The penalties for these violations would have been quite
severe. For example, an individual found liable for securities
fraud could have been subjected to a one million dollar fine or a
maximum prison term of ten years.247 Directors’ willingness to
engage in inappropriate behavior despite these penalties raises
doubts about the ability of legal sanctions to deter corporate
misbehavior. Despite these doubts, the thrust of Sarbanes248
Oxley’s legal sanctions centers on enhancing legal penalties.
244. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 240, at 1602–03 & n.261 (discussing
subjects commonly detailed in corporate codes).
245. See Braithwaite & Makkai, supra note 222, at 29 (concluding that criminal
sanctions failed to deter the conduct of nursing home managers in Australia); Sally S.
Simpson & Christopher S. Koper, Deterring Corporate Crime, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 347, 347–
48 (1992) (finding little support for the deterrence theory among antitrust violators).
246. For example, Enron’s Chairman of the Board, Kenneth Lay, was recently
charged with securities fraud and insider trading. John R. Emshwiller et. al, Lay Strikes
Back as Indictment Cites Narrow Role in Enron Fraud, WALL ST. J., July 9, 2004, at A1.
Both Jeffrey Skilling, former Enron CEO, and Bernard Ebbers, former WorldCom CEO,
were charged with securities fraud. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Targeting the Top in Corporate
Crime: Prosecutors Are Working to Hold Former Executives Accountable, WASH. POST,
Mar. 3, 2004, at A8.
247. See supra text accompanying note 179 (describing previous penalties for
securities fraud).
248. Indeed, Sarbanes-Oxley includes an entire section entitled “White-Collar Crime
Penalty Enhancements” that augments the criminal penalties for various federal
securities law violations. Sarbanes-Oxley Title IX (codified as the White-Collar Crime
Penalty Enhancement Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1349, 1350, 28 U.S.C. § 94, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1131 (2002)).
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For example, the Act increases the maximum penalty for
securities fraud from ten years in prison or one million dollars in
fines or both, to twenty years in prison or five million dollars in
fines or both.249 However, critics condemn these increases,
pointing out the lack of evidence that the increased penalties will
do any more to deter directors’ behavior than the penalties in
250
existence prior to Sarbanes-Oxley.
This condemnation may be misguided because it discounts
the studies emphasizing the importance of enhancement while
failing to give sufficient weight to the importance of certainty in
improving the deterrent value of legal liability. Although some
empirical and anecdotal evidence supports the notion that merely
enhancing legal penalties does little to deter wrongdoing, other
251
studies contradict this evidence. These studies confirm the
importance of enhanced penalties in deterring illegal behavior
while criticizing the limited scope of studies that reach an
opposite result.252 Moreover, such studies demonstrate that
249. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 1106 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78ff). Sarbanes-Oxley
also increases the maximum penalty for mail and wire fraud from five years to twenty
years in prison. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 903 (amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343).
250. See Moohr, supra note 180, at 955 (questioning the effectiveness of imposing
more severe penalties as a means to increasingly deter corporate misconduct); Ribstein,
supra note 34, at 34 (noting that recent incidents of fraud suggest that corporate officials
are willing to risk liability and reputational damage, and hence it is unlikely that added
liability will produce additional constraints on behavior). It is notable that many of the
scholars who question the power of legal sanctions argue that imposing these sanctions on
directors may prove too powerful by causing some directors to be overly cautious and
others to refuse to serve at all. It seems contradictory to claim that sanctions are too weak
to deter illegal conduct, yet powerful enough to threaten the corporation’s ability to
appoint directors willing to make appropriate business decisions. It may be true that for
people who are already predisposed to commit fraud, the threat of personal liability may
neither prevent them from seeking a directorship nor deter them from engaging in
inappropriate conduct once they secure that position. However, for otherwise honest and
law-abiding people, one would expect that the legitimate threat of legal sanctions not only
would cause them to think twice before accepting a directorship, but also think twice (and
ask twice the questions) before acquiescing in the disclosure of questionable or inaccurate
information about their corporation. Although this debate reveals that these sanctions
may be a double-edged sword, it also supports the notion that they can serve as one of the
most powerful regulators of corporate conduct.
251. See Richard C. Hollinger & John P. Clark, Deterrence in the Workplace:
Perceived Certainty, Perceived Severity, and Employee Theft, 62 SOC. FORCES 398, 407–08,
413–14 (1983) (finding that increased certainty and severity of negative consequences
deterred employee theft); Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Just in Crime: Guiding Economic Crime
Reform After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 359, 414–17 (2003)
(recognizing the difficulties surrounding empirical testing of the effects of penalties on the
rate of white-collar crime but concluding that the imposition of stiff prison sentences is
necessary to discourage economic crime); Simpson & Koper, supra note 245, at 360
(finding that sanction severity deterred some offenders).
252. See Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 227, at 552–53 (noting the failure of
previous studies to consider the combined deterrence effects of formal and informal
sanctions against white-collar crime).
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increasing the certainty of legal sanctions effectively deters
misconduct.253 Thus, a study of MBA students and corporate
executives found that legal sanctions had a significant deterrent
254
effect on the decision to engage in illegal corporate acts. Like
other studies, this study revealed that in order for legal sanctions
to deter misconduct, there must be certainty—a legitimate risk
255
that such sanctions will be imposed. Part II.B revealed that
prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, such a risk was not present. This view is
consistent with empirical research highlighting the fact that
white-collar criminals rarely face prosecution or significant legal
penalties for their crimes.256 This research suggests that legal
sanctions fail to constrain director misbehavior because of the
relatively low risk that such sanctions will actually be imposed.
Thus, to the extent that critics rely on the failure of legal
sanctions to curb director misconduct as evidence of the
257
ineffectiveness of legal liability as a whole, their criticism is
misguided. Instead, most evidence supports the notion that legal
sanctions can serve as a powerful deterrent to misconduct when
258
properly implemented.

253. See Hollinger & Clark, supra note 251, at 399 (“[O]f the three major variables in
the deterrence process—perceived certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment—the
consensus of empirical research is that perceived certainty of punishment is the most
effective in shaping behavior.”); Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, Tax Compliance and
Perceptions of the Risks of Detection and Criminal Prosecution, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 209,
210–11, 237–39 (1989) (finding that a greater risk of detection and prosecution deterred
people from cheating on their taxes); see also Simpson & Koper, supra note 245, at 348
(“Empirical studies . . . suggest . . . that certainty of sanction is more important than
severity.”).
254. See Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 227, at 557, 579–80 (concluding that
threats of criminal and civil sanctions serve as an effective deterrent to corporate crime).
255. See id. at 578–79 (noting that sanctioning businesses as well as individuals
significantly discourages employees from engaging in wrongdoing); see also Fairfax, supra
note 21, at 50–51 (explaining experts’ belief that criminal penalties deter crime when
criminals face certainty of punishment).
256. See Joseph E. Kennedy, Making the Crime Fit the Punishment, 51 EMORY L. J.
753, 756 (2002) (finding that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines promulgated in the 1980s
had the perverse effect of encouraging judges to become more lenient by interpreting
criminal statutes in a light more favorable to the accused); Ramirez, supra note 251, at
397–98 (showing that judges often sentenced white-collar criminals at the lowest end of
permitted range under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines or permitted downward
departures from the prescribed minimums); see also Fairfax, supra note 21, at 57–59
(reviewing evidence revealing that white collar criminals have a low probability of being
prosecuted and receive relatively light penalties).
257. See Moohr, supra note 180, at 943 (noting that increased sentencing minimums
for certain white-collar offenses failed to reduce crime).
258. See supra notes 251–55 and accompanying text (pointing to studies that show a
correlation between the increased certainty and severity of punishment and deterrence of
crime).
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This analysis reveals that Sarbanes-Oxley’s new sanctions
could be effective if there were a legitimate certainty that such
sanctions would be imposed. Part II.C demonstrated ways in
which the Act may increase directors’ exposure to liability
under state law and revealed that the Act may increase the
ability to prove directors’ knowledge of corporate misdeeds,
thereby increasing the ability to hold directors liable for
federal securities law violations. If the Act has such an impact,
then it may lead to a greater probability that directors will be
held legally accountable for their misbehavior. If this renewed
certainty occurs, then Sarbanes-Oxley could increase the
deterrent impact of legal sanctions.
However, Part II.C also demonstrated that SarbanesOxley may not significantly enhance the possibility that
directors will face legal liability for violations of their duty.259
In this regard, Sarbanes-Oxley may be flawed. By failing to
impose direct legal liability on directors for their misconduct,260
the Act may fail to enhance certainty and thus may undermine
the deterrent effect of legal penalties both specifically within
the Act and more generally. Thus, Sarbanes-Oxley may
represent a missed opportunity to infuse greater certainty, and
hence the necessary deterrent, into legal liability.
Of course, any increased certainty depends upon a
heretofore-lacking willingness to impose significant legal
261
penalties on corporate directors. Evidence suggests not only
a relatively low risk that directors will be prosecuted, and thus
convicted, for their crimes, but also that directors tend to
receive light, if any, penalties after being convicted.262
Although there are various reasons for this phenomenon, our
legal system appears to lack the will to hold directors
personally liable for dereliction of their duties.263 This

259. See supra notes 184–87 (discussing the possibility that corporate insurance and
state incorporation laws may continue to shield directors from liability).
260. See supra text accompanying notes 188–89 (expressing concern that SarbanesOxley may have deferred to state law with respect to remedies for directors’ violations of
fiduciary duty).
261. See, e.g., G. Robert Blakey & Scott D. Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil
RICO: Reflections on Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim: Will Civil RICO Be
Effective Only Against White-Collar Crime?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 526, 568 n.191
(1987) (explaining why the government has shown lenience toward economic crime).
262. See Fairfax, supra note 21, at 57–58 (describing studies on white collar
criminals showing low prosecutions and minimal punishment).
263. See id. at 59–60 (listing society’s reluctance to treat economic crimes harshly, the
view that white-collar defendants are sufficiently penalized by criminal adjudication, and the
(typically) superior economic status of white-collar defendants as explanations for “the
tendency to treat white-collar criminals with kid gloves”). In fact, experts advance various
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weakness in our legal system represents one reason why
directors have faced a low risk or certainty of punishment.264
However, the arrest, prosecution, and even conviction of high265
to former
profile corporate officers from Martha Stewart
reasons why white-collar criminals may be considered less culpable than other criminals. See,
e.g., STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE COLLAR
CRIMINALS 192 (1988) (noting that judges tend to be more lenient toward white-collar offenders
who may “remind [them] of a colleague or neighbor, while the street offender is no more than a
stranger”); Brown, supra note 225, at 1331–32 (attributing the availability of civil penalties for
white-collar crime—unlike street crime—and the nature of its social costs as explanations for
the imposition of civil, rather than criminal, liability). Some argue that because white-collar
offenses do not involve violence, those who commit such offenses are less deserving of harsh
legal sanctions than those who commit violent offenses. See WHEELER ET AL., supra, at 144–46
(discussing the belief of some judges that the criminal prosecution of white-collar criminals “is
itself a kind of punishment” because of the defendants’ loss of reputation and public
humiliation, while street-criminals holding “low social status” do not suffer the same loss); see
also J. Kelly Strader, The Judicial Politics of White-Collar Crime, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1199,
1264–65 (1999) (interpreting Justice White’s dissent in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,
1023 (1991) (White, J., dissenting), as suggesting that “the defendant’s ‘moral guilt’ was less
than that of violent criminals”). Others argue that because many people who commit whitecollar offenses do not have a history of criminal or illegal behavior, they are less culpable than
other offenders. See WHEELER ET AL., supra, at 88–90 (illustrating how judges show more
lenience toward first-time offenders and noting that most white-collar defendants have no prior
record). Some may suggest, in fact, that directors are less culpable than their executive
counterparts and hence less deserving of legal sanctions because a director’s role is passive and
involves a failure to monitor, as opposed to active engagement in the fraudulent actions. See,
e.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130–31 (Del. 1963) (refusing to impose
an affirmative duty upon directors to police wrongdoing within the corporation). This
characterization suggests that it is inappropriate to hold directors legally liable for their
actions (or inactions), especially if such liability takes the form of incarceration. Such a
rationale may explain the differential treatment between directors and their managerial
counterparts, the latter of whom are deemed to be more involved in the daily affairs of the
corporation and hence more culpable. See supra notes 72–76 (contrasting the penalties
imposed on directors and officers). This issue about the relative culpability of directors deserves
greater attention and is beyond the scope of this Article. However, it should be noted that both
the Guidelines and Sarbanes-Oxley appear to recognize that those who commit economic
crimes have greater culpability than is traditionally believed. See Moohr, supra note 180, at
941–43, 954–55 (describing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as mandating strict penalties
for economic crimes even before Sarbanes-Oxley and stating that Sarbanes-Oxley has further
increased maximum prison sentences for certain white-collar crimes by several hundred
percent). Then too, arguments downplaying directors’ culpability minimize the significant
monitoring role directors must undertake when carrying out their fiduciary responsibilities.
See In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 968–70 (Del. Ch. 1996) (recognizing the important
role directors play in ensuring the well-being of the business and requiring them to establish
sufficient monitoring systems within the corporation).
264. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349,
378–79 (1997) (arguing that lack of certainty will lead “some potential law-breakers [to] infer
that crime pays,” which will encourage them to “act accordingly”).
265. See Brooke A. Masters, Martha Stewart Sentenced to Prison: Punishment Postponed
as She Appeals Verdict, WASH. POST, July 17, 2004, at A01 (reporting that Stewart received a
sentence of five months in prison and five months in home confinement); Brooke A. Masters &
Ben White, Stewart Guilty on All Charges: Businesswoman Conspired with Broker, Jury Says,
WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2004, at A01 (announcing Stewart’s conviction for conspiracy, obstruction,
and lying to federal investigators). For a discussion of the Martha Stewart case, see generally
Joan MacLeod Heminway, Save Martha Stewart? Observations About Equal Justice in U.S.
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Enron CFO Andrew Fastow266 suggest a rejection of this
weakness.267 Not only did judges in these cases appear less
lenient than usual, but some legal experts remarked that the
severity of the sentences were unprecedented in the context of
white-collar crime.268 More significantly, that Enron and
WorldCom directors agreed to bear millions of dollars in personal
liability as part of settlement agreements with shareholders—
even though judges had dismissed suits for securities fraud
against them—suggests shareholders’ determination to hold
269
directors personally liable. These events increase the certainty
of legal liability, even if only temporarily.270 Moreover, because of
their high-profile nature, these new penalties send a signal to
corporate officials that may alter their perception of their
potential criminal liability and that should reverberate for years
to come.271 In this regard, these events may increase certainty of
punishment, which in turn should increase the deterrent impact
of legal remedies.
This assessment refutes concerns that legal sanctions cannot
be useful deterrents. If there are sufficient signals for directors to
Insider Trading Regulation, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 247 (2003).
266. See Editorial, Enron Justice, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2004, at A14 [hereinafter Enron
Justice] (calling Fastow’s sentence “eye-popping,” and “among the harshest ever handed down
for a white-collar crime”); Carrie Johnson, Lea Fastow Sentenced to 1-Year Term, WASH. POST,
May 7, 2004, at E01 [hereinafter Johnson, Lea Fastow Sentenced] (noting that Andrew Fastow
received a ten-year prison term after pleading guilty to conspiracy charges and that his wife
Lea Fastow was sentenced to a one-year prison term after pleading guilty to filing a false tax
return); Carrie Johnson, Enron Wizard Admits Conspiracy, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2004, at A01
[hereinafter Johnson, Enron Wizard] (noting that Andrew Fastow pled guilty to two counts of
conspiracy and will serve ten years in prison and three years on probation).
267. See Fairfax, supra note 21, at 59–60 (crediting political pressure for the change
in attitude toward corporate wrongdoers).
268. For example, the judge overseeing Lea Fastow’s plea agreement refused to
accept an earlier deal that called for her to spend five months in prison and five months in
home confinement. Johnson, Lea Fastow Sentenced, supra note 266. Instead, the judge
rejected her plea for leniency and sentenced her to a maximum of one year in prison. Id.;
see also Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Targeting the Top in Corporate Crime: Prosecutors Are
Working to Hold Former Executives Accountable, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2004, at A08
(quoting Professor John Coffee, who noted that whereas previous cases involving misuse
of corporate funds would typically settle, corporate officials now face the possibility of
personal liability); Johnson, Enron Wizard, supra note 266 (noting that legal experts
called Andrew Fastow’s term “unusually stiff” and quoting a Deputy Attorney General
who called the sentence “‘unheard of’”).
269. See White, supra note 4 (interviewing attorneys for Enron and WorldCom
plaintiffs, who noted that the settlements revealed a new phase in which shareholders
would push directors to bear much higher personal costs for their fiduciary failures).
270. See Fairfax, supra note 21, at 60–62 (cautioning that changes in attitudes
regarding corporate misconduct may be temporary).
271. See Enron Justice, supra note 266, at A14 (“The deterrent effect of seeing Mr.
Fastow severely punished is likely to be far more bracing for everyone in business than
one more proscription out of Congress or the SEC.”).
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use to distinguish between improper and proper conduct272 and if
there is some degree of certainty that improper conduct will lead
to legal sanctions, then legal sanctions can serve as powerful
constraints on directors.
C.

Birds of a Feather . . . : The Interdependence of Legal and
Extra-Legal Forces

In addition to suggesting their relative power, Enron
suggests that legal sanctions may be a necessary precondition to
the effectiveness of other extra-legal measures. The lesson of
Enron may not be simply that legal sanctions are necessary to fill
the gap when other measures fail, but rather that these other
measures may inevitably fail without the presence of legal
sanctions.
1. Deterrence and the Laws of Reputation. Assuming
directors do in fact desire to protect their reputation,273 one
explanation for reputational sanctions’ failure to deter director
misbehavior may be that directors do not believe their conduct
will be detected. Some commentators have noted the difficulties
274
associated with ferreting out corporate crime. Because of these
difficulties, directors of the past may have believed they could
commit illegal actions free from detection.275 This freedom meant
that directors did not have to fear damage to their reputation as
a result of such actions. However, this relative difficulty with
detecting corporate misconduct actually supports the need for
legal penalties. Indeed, several scholars and judges maintain
that when people commit acts that involve a low probability of
detection, adequate deterrence requires an augmentation of the
penalties associated with such acts.276 Thus, if the difficulty of
272. See Moohr, supra note 180, at 960 (noting that the potential corporate lawbreaker needs sufficient notice of what constitutes criminal conduct before he can make a
rational decision not to engage in unlawful activity).
273. One explanation for the failure of reputational sanctions to deter directors’
conduct could be that directors do not care about damage to their reputation. See Edward
B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV.
1009, 1103 (1997) (hypothesizing that businessmen with “sufficiently thick skins” may not
be deterred by a mere threat of public shaming). Given their status in the community,
however such an explanation appears unrealistic. See CHRISTOPHER CHERNIAK, MINIMAL
RATIONALITY 9–11 (1986) (noting that humans are minimally rational beings whose
conduct is guided by expected consequences).
274. See Moohr, supra note 180, at 961 (using fraud as an example of an economic
crime that is difficult to detect because it “occurs in secret, often by those who are able to
control and conceal information that might lead to detection”).
275. See id.
276. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, 197 (1981) (“[I]f the
probability of punishment is less than one, the fine must be raised so that the expected
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detection explains why directors of the past did not fear
reputational sanctions, then the corporate regime must impose
significant penalties in order to restore that fear and ensure the
effectiveness of reputational sanctions.
This same restoration of fear may also be necessary if
reputational sanctions failed because of directors’ assessment of
their conduct: Another explanation for the ineffectiveness of
reputational sanctions may be that the directors—and the
communities to which they belonged—did not believe their
conduct merited such sanctions.277 This belief finds support in the
exoneration trend.278 In order for the various communities to
which directors belong to impose reputational sanctions, such
communities must have some standard by which to judge
director conduct.279 The legal regime plays a critical role in
280
shaping that standard. The regime defines acceptable conduct

cost of punishment will remain equal to the cost of the violation.”); David A. Dana,
Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders, 110 YALE L.J. 733, 740
(2001) (noting that optimal deterrence suggests that society should impose greater
sanctions against those whose behavior is less likely to be detected); see also, e.g., United
States v. Grimes, 173 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting the need for “a higher than
average punishment” for wrongs “less likely to be detected and punished”); United States
v. Garrison, 133 F.3d 831, 838 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that the purpose of a specific
sentencing enhancement is to impose increased penalties on those “who take advantage of
a position that provides them freedom to commit or conceal a difficult-to-detect wrong”);
United States v. Hill, 915 F.2d 502, 504, 506–08 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying a penalty
enhancement because the defendant had the “freedom to commit a difficult-to-detect
wrong”). In fact, under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the ability of a person to
commit a crime that is difficult to detect is one of the factors used to establish a “position
of public or private trust,” the abuse of which merits enhanced sanctions. See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 (2000) (requiring a two-level increasedculpability adjustment for the abuse of such position).
277. O’Connor, supra note 20, at 1236–40 (explaining how social forces within small
groups—like boards of directors—permit the rationalization of forbidden behavior and
inhibit the ability of members to engage in objective decisionmaking).
278. See supra notes 265–71 and accompanying text (discussing the justice system’s
failure to impose stiff penalties for white-collar crime).
279. See Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A
Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 374–75
(1999) (explaining that government may be instrumental in establishing norms for
behavior through shaming penalties, which will eliminate the collective action problems
arising from private shaming).
280. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 99, at 1797 (explaining the role of judicial
opinions in framing social norms); Eisenberg, supra note 108, at 1269–70 (noting that
legal rules clarify and facilitate the effectiveness of informal sanctions by sending a
message about the proper standard of conduct for directors, which increases the likelihood
that reputational penalties will be imposed); Rock, supra note 273, at 1016 (noting that
legal rules instruct directors on how to behave and “influence the development
of . . . social norms”); David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1811, 1820 (2001) (noting that norms enforced by shaming cannot survive without
enforcement through shaming sanctions—public statements “directed at the offender[s],
and addressed to the relevant community”).
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in at least two ways: (1) by providing legal opinions that
articulate acceptable behavior,281 and (2) by penalizing those who
fail to conform to that behavior.282 Recently, several scholars have
highlighted the important role legal opinions play in defining
norms of behavior for directors.283 These scholars argue that legal
opinions obviate the need for legal sanctions because
communities rely on the norms articulated by such opinions to
regulate director conduct.284 Although compelling, this argument
281. See Rock, supra note 273, at 1016 (characterizing the role of judges as
“preachers” whose rulings spur the development of social norms).
282. See Skeel, supra note 280, at 1829 (describing the goal of imposing liability on
corporations as a means of controlling corporate behavior).
283. See id. at 1825–26 (noting the key role courts play in shaming corporate
criminals); see also Eisenberg, supra note 108, at 1270 (noting that legal cases have an
expressive effect and help clarify the standard of conduct for directors); Rock, supra note
273, at 1016–17 (viewing the role of courts as prescribing standards of behavior that
constrain corporate actions). Professor Eisenberg defines social norms as “rules and
regularities concerning human conduct, other than legal rules and organizational rules.”
Eisenberg, supra note 108, at 1255. His scholarly work on social norms as they relate to
corporate law builds on a body of literature that examines the importance of social norms
in regulating conduct. See generally, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System:
Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 116,
138–45 (1992) (discussing the centrality of “reputation bonds” within the diamond
industry as a form of “private law”); David Charny, Illusions of a Spontaneous Order:
“Norms” in Contractual Relationships, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1841 (1996) (addressing the
broad issues behind the development, function, and economic efficiency of nonlegal norms;
whether and when norms should be recognized by law; and analyzing those norms within
the American grain industry and the products liability system of Japan); Robert Cooter,
Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998) (using an economic model
to explain the influence of social norms on individuals and the internalization and
expression of those norms); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM.
L. REV. 903 (1996) (examining features and misconceptions of social norms and
advocating government participation in the management of social norms). Professor
Eisenberg describes three categories of norms, see Eisenberg, supra note 108, at 1256–57,
and refers to those that shape director conduct as “obligational norms” with which people
feel compelled to comply either because they “internalized the norm[s] or because [they]
fear . . . external sanctions” for violating them. Id. at 1257–58. Professors Blair and Stout
add to this body of work through their discussion of the impact of trust on directors and
other corporate agents, noting that judicial opinions frame social norms that encourage
corporate actors to view their relationships as cooperative. See Blair & Stout, supra note
99, at 1796–98.
284. See Eisenberg, supra note 108, at 1265 (crediting legal authorities with spurring
changes in norms regarding the fiduciary obligations of directors); Rock, supra note 273,
at 1016–17 (characterizing judicial opinions as “parables” that provide normative
guidance to corporate officials but cannot be reduced to rules). Professor Eisenberg notes
that a shift in social norms provides one explanation for the divergence between directors’
limited exposure to liability and court opinions that stress the importance of the duty of
care—these opinions generate the norms to which directors feel obliged to comply. See
Eisenberg, supra note 108, at 1268–70. Indeed, these legal rules also impact director
conduct even without the input of communities because people internalize the norms
created by such rules and these internalized norms in turn shape director behavior. See
id. at 1268–69 (describing how the symbiotic relationship between legal rules and social
norms explains the changes in attitude toward a director’s duty of care). Indeed,
Eisenberg notes that while some people adhere to norms based on a fear of reputational
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has at least two flaws. The first flaw is that it fails to appreciate
the negative implications the exoneration trend has on the ability
of courts to render opinions. Indeed, exculpatory statutes ensure
that many cases are dismissed before courts can comment on the
merits of the underlying action.285 In addition, the combination of
D&O insurance and indemnification provisions encourages
settlements, thereby preventing many cases from reaching the
courts.286 Because few cases in this arena are fully litigated,
judges and courts cannot render opinions and perform their
287
important norm-creating function. The trend away from legal
liability undermines the ability of courts to provide signals
regarding the kind of conduct that should receive condemnation,
highlighting the need for legal sanctions to support reputational
ones.
Another flaw in the argument against legal sanctions is that
it fails to appreciate the important role legal penalties play in
288
establishing norms. Just as legal opinions play a crucial role in
generating norms, legal sanctions serve as an important
barometer for measuring whether directors’ conduct merits
reputational sanctions.289 If directors receive no legal sanctions
for their conduct, the extent to which that conduct appears
objectionable is minimized. Thus, because the legal system rarely
if ever holds directors personally liable for engaging in lax
conduct, directors and the communities to which they belong may
view such conduct as acceptable.290 As a consequence, the system

sanctions, these norms “stabilize only if they are internalized by a significant portion of
the relevant social group.” Id. at 1260.
285. See, e.g., Kuykendall, supra note 109, at 477–79 (discussing Gagliardi v.
Trifoods International, Inc., 683 A.2d. 1049 (Del. Ch. 1996), which applied the business
judgment rule to the conduct of directors but could not have been litigated had an
exculpatory statute been in effect).
286. A.C. Pritchard, Who Cares?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 883, 886 (2002) (“As a result of
the universal practice of settlement, officers and directors are usually able to walk away
without paying anything. Directors’ and officers’ insurance pays a portion of settlements,
with the corporation paying the remainder.” (footnotes omitted)).
287. See supra note 285 and accompanying text (discussing the inability of courts to
examine corporate conduct covered by exculpatory statutes).
288. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 283, at 958 (recognizing the importance of
government regulation in enforcing and shaping norms).
289. David A. Westbrook, Corporation Law After Enron: The Possibility of a
Capitalist Reimagination, 92 GEO. L.J. 61, 92 (2003) (“One way to inform a culture is
through legal sanctions that punish those individuals who violate cultural norms.”).
Professors Blair and Stout recognize that lawsuits serve an important signaling function,
but they caution that lawsuits may “suggest . . . that breach of duty is common, even
normal, in business relationships[,]” which might encourage others to engage in similar
conduct. Blair & Stout, supra note 99, at 1798.
290. See John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud, and Securities Reform: An Enron
Prosecutor’s Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 57, 111 (2005) (commenting that the failure
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supports the notion that engaging in lax conduct does not pose a
risk to their reputation.291 From this perspective, because the
corporate regime shields directors from being held liable, it
undermines the effectiveness of reputational sanctions. In fact, it
was not until our legal and political system openly condemned
Enron officials that their reputations began to suffer.292 Prior to
this condemnation, some of their peers appeared willing to
defend the actions of Enron officials.293 This reinforces the notion
that legal sanctions represent an important aspect of
reputational sanctions. Because the legal regime is one of the
lenses through which we judge the quality of an individual’s
reputation, that system must hold people liable for inappropriate
behavior in order to signal that such behavior should be
condemned by the community.
In this regard, an effective legal regime represents a
necessary precondition to effective reputational sanctions. This
interdependence also reveals the defects of relying solely on
reputational sanctions to regulate director behavior.
2. Deterrence and the Laws of the Market. Like
reputational sanctions, the market needs the support of the legal
regime in order to perform its deterrent function properly.
Professor John Coffee has emphasized the need to supplement a
294
market-based system with federal regulation. Professor Coffee
points out that a purely market-based system is incomplete in
part because market professionals must rely on data provided to
them by the issuer, and the market does not properly incentivize
the issuer to provide full and honest disclosure voluntarily.295

to impose harsh legal penalties against corporate criminals in the late 1980s sent “the
message that white collar crime [was] not serious”).
291. See Michael B. Dorff, Softening Pharaoh’s Heart: Harnessing Altruistic Theory
and Behavioral Law and Economics to Rein in Executive Salaries, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 811,
847–48 (2003) (discussing that while reputational pressures provide some incentive for
board members to independently audit the actions of the corporation’s officers,
maintaining one’s board position provides far greater incentives).
292. See Ronald Brownstein et. al, The Nation: Washington Friends Desert Enron
Chief; Energy: White House and Lawmakers Keep a Distance Amid Probe, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 15, 2001, at A1 (detailing the retreat of Enron’s political allies after the company’s
highly-publicized demise).
293. See Sheila McNulty, Profile Kenneth Lay: Patriarch’s Departure Leaves Mix of
Feelings, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 25, 2002, at 24 (profiling Lay as having a “largerthan-life persona in Houston” prior to Enron’s collapse and having been abandoned by
“political beneficiaries” like George W. Bush after the company’s demise).
294. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a
Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984).
295. See id. at 722–23.
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Others appear to agree that the market cannot perform its
regulatory function without the support of the law.296
This support has two components. First, legal sanctions are
necessary to counteract the market’s tendency to encourage
directors to be overly optimistic. Because positive financial
results translate into higher stock prices, the market places
considerable pressure on corporate managers and directors to
297
take actions that ensure those results. In a climate in which
the market reacts quickly to negative news, no one wants to be
responsible for its publication. Consequently, the market may
provide a strong incentive to corporate directors to publish overly
optimistic news while ignoring red flags and failing to scrutinize
officer conduct.298 Because of this incentive, our corporate
governance system needs legal sanctions to serve as a
countervailing force, pressuring directors to pay heed to their
fiduciary responsibility of ensuring the disclosure of corporate
news, whether positive or negative.
Second, legal incentives are necessary to support market
professionals’ efforts to assess a corporation properly. The
market depends on market professionals to evaluate available
information about a given corporation. Market professionals, in
turn, depend on corporations to provide them with relevant and
accurate information. Enron revealed that if corporate officers
manipulate or distort corporate information, then the role of
market professionals—and thus the market—is undermined.
Although market professionals bear some responsibility for

296. See Paredes, supra note 19, at 526.
297. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corporate Governance, 45
VAND. L. REV. 1263, 1287–92 (1992) (describing how stock prices can become a “surrogate
for directorial performance”); Robert G. Vanecko, Regulations 14A and 13D and the Role
of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 376, 410–14 (1992)
(discussing market pressures to demonstrate strong financial results and analyzing
whether institutional investors reduce such pressure); see also U.S. Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Oversight Hearing on “Accounting and Investor
Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public Companies”, 1318 PRACTISING L.
INST. 535, 538 (2002) (prepared statement of Mr. Ira M. Millstein, co-chair of Blue Ribbon
Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, created by the
NYSE and NASD at the request of the SEC) (noting the increased pressure to ensure
short-term stock performance and satisfy financial expectations, which may encourage
corporate actors to ignore shareholder value and engage in high risk actions).
298. See Mitchell, supra note 297, at 1287–92. It has been noted that regulation may
be needed to curb the overly optimistic tendencies of directors and officers. See In re Caere
Corp. Sec. Litig., 837 F. Supp. 1054, 1057–58 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (noting the optimism of
corporate executives who have personal stakes in the company); Donald C. Langevoort,
Disclosures That “Bespeak Caution,” 49 BUS. LAW. 481 (1994) (discussing growth of the
“bespeaks caution” doctrine to counteract optimism of corporate managers); Ribstein,
supra note 34, at 2–3 (noting some tendency of “efficient securities markets” to be “overly
optimistic”).
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failing to detect inaccurate corporate information,299 directors
share the blame because they have a fiduciary responsibility to
monitor the corporation’s business affairs and the officers who
300
report those affairs. Thus, directors must serve as a final check
on the information officers provide to market professionals and
the public. If directors believe they can ignore their responsibility
without fear of significant legal reprisals, then they will fail to
provide the necessary check on corporate misinformation.
Without that check, the market cannot properly carry out its
role. From this perspective, the market depends on legal
sanctions because such sanctions ensure that directors carry out
their corporate responsibilities, which in turn increases the
potential that corporate information will be accurate.
This discussion indicates the need to ensure that legal
liability represents a component of the framework for regulating
corporate conduct. This Article does not advocate reliance solely
on legal sanctions, any more than it advocates reliance solely on
the market or reputational sanctions. Instead, legal liability
should be used in combination with other measures for
regulating director conduct. Such legal liability not only provides
a powerful source of deterrence, but also buttresses extra-legal
measures.301 Ultimately, legal liability is necessary both when
these measures fail and in order for these measures to succeed.
D. The Corporate Catch-22 and the Costs of Director Liability
The conclusion that legal sanctions may be necessary to
regulate director conduct appears to raise a dilemma for the
existing corporate governance structure. First, scholars claim
that too much personal liability is quite simply bad for business
because it undermines the innovation necessary for businesses to
thrive.302 Second, scholars insist that too much exposure to
personal liability will ultimately ensure that corporations cannot
fill director positions by making such positions undesirable for
most people.303 In this sense, legitimate risk of legal liability
299. See Millon, supra note 217, at 321 (noting that market analysts had “blind faith
in Enron”).
300. See supra notes 14–19 and accompanying text (explaining corporate directors’
fiduciary duty of care to monitor corporate actors).
301. See supra notes 193–208 and accompanying text (discussing the
interrelationship between legal liability and extra-legal measures—in particular,
deterrence as affected by reputational concerns and market laws).
302. Cf. Balotti & Gentile, supra note 183, at 8–9 (noting that the threat of personal
liability “could force directors to act defensively out of concern over costly personal
litigation”).
303. See id. at 9 (“The general result has been that many qualified individuals have
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seems at odds with a corporate governance structure that relies
on outside board members.
Many scholars maintain that if there is significant risk that
directors can be held personally liable for their conduct on
corporate boards, that risk will chill innovation and risk-taking
304
to the detriment of shareholders. Under this rationale, because
directors fear being punished for their innovation through
hindsight assessments of their activities, directors always will
choose the most conservative course of action, tending to reject
transactions that involve any risk, even when some risk may be
acceptable and necessary for the corporation to thrive.305 It
certainly makes sense that directors who fear personal liability
will be unwilling to make or approve decisions that appear even
remotely risky. In fact, drafters of the Model Business
Corporation Act’s exculpatory provision recognized this
potentially negative impact of legal liability when writing that
Act.306 The drafters argued that directors needed protection from
exposure to personal liability so that “directors would not be
discouraged from fully and freely carrying out their duties,
including responsible entrepreneurial risk-taking.”307
However, this argument seems more applicable as a
justification for a lower standard of review for directors’ conduct
than for eradicating liability altogether. Indeed, we employ the
business judgment rule with a focus on corporate procedures to
ensure that directors who use their business judgment are not
subject to Monday-morning quarterbacking.308 If directors fail to
comply with even that lax standard of judgment, there needs to
be some risk that they will be held personally accountable.
Another argument against imposing legal sanctions on
directors is that such an imposition would make people unwilling
to serve as directors.309 This argument insists that the threat of

refused to serve as directors.”).
304. See, e.g., id. at 10 (citing the synopsis to DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (2001) as
noting that liability may deter directors from making entrepreneurial decisions); Frank
H. Easterbrook & Gregg A. Jarrell, Do Targets Gain from Defeating Tender Offers?, 59
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 277, 277 (“The business judgment rule gives managers the freedom to err,
and thus it facilitates risk-taking.”).
305. Cf. Phillips, supra note 193, at 683 (noting that the fear of litigation may cause
corporate managers to choose the less risky or safe option even if it does not benefit the
corporation).
306. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 2.02(b)(4) cmt.i (2002).
307. Id.
308. See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text (explaining the purpose of the
business judgment rule).
309. See, e.g., Balotti & Gentile, supra note 183, at 10 (quoting R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI
& JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS
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millions of dollars in personal liability will be enough to dissuade
people from serving as directors, especially given the relatively
small amount of money outside directors receive for their
service.310 Certainly, after Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley,
newspapers reported instances of corporations having difficulties
with filling director vacancies as well as instances of people
unwilling to serve as directors because of concerns regarding
increased legal liability and decreased availability of D&O
insurance.311 Similarly, after Van Gorkom, newspapers reported
312
instances of director resignations. The possibility that people
may shy away from serving as directors may be even more
salient because we now rely more heavily on outside directors.
Indeed, outside directors have other means of employment and
thus have less financial or occupational incentive to serve as
directors, particularly when that service entails significant risk
of legal liability.313 If imposing liability on directors discourages
them from service, then our corporate governance system will be
rendered inoperative.
However, because alternative measures have proved
insufficient to deter director laxity, the corporate governance
system must rely on legal sanctions and therefore must bear the
cost associated with those sanctions. Even proponents of
alternatives to legal sanctions concede that we must look towards
legal sanctions when the alternatives prove ineffective.314 Enron
suggests that the costs of eliminating liability completely and
thereby allowing corporate malfeasance to go unchecked are
simply unacceptable. For this reason, we must accept legal

ORGANIZATIONS § 102 cmt. (3d ed. 2005)); Robert W. Hamilton, Reliance and Liability
Standards for Outside Directors, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 5, 28–30 (1989).
310. See Paredes, supra note 19, at 520–21 (noting that reform efforts may narrow
the pool of potential candidates for directors).
311. See, e.g., Kemba J. Dunham, Reforms Turn Search for Directors into a Long,
Tedious Task, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2002, at B1 (reporting that “the once-routine task of
finding a new director has suddenly become a time-consuming and often frustrating
process for companies”); see also BLACK ET AL., supra note 101, at 1 n.4 (citing studies
indicating that a significant percentage of people have declined board positions because of
fear of increased liability).
312. See Laurie Baum & John A. Byrne, The Job Nobody Wants, BUS. WK., Sept. 8,
1986, at 56 (reporting resignations of outside directors due to the increased risk of
liability and higher liability insurance); see also Taylor, supra note 126, at 1053 (noting
that in the wake of Van Gorkom “many outside directors of public companies resigned,
declined to stand for re-election or refused nomination”).
313. See Hamilton, supra note 309, at 28 (noting that, when faced with a serious risk
of personal liability, outside directors often decide that the risks outweigh the benefits).
314. See Phillips, supra note 193, at 673 n.88 (remarking that it is appropriate to
consider legal sanctions when extra-legal controls do not control undesirable conduct).
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sanctions and their attendant costs as a part of the corporate
governance system.
It should be pointed out that the actual extent of these costs
remains uncertain. Indeed, while there are reports of isolated
director resignations, no real study of the impact that enhanced
liability has on directors’ willingness to serve exists, so there is
no proof that such an enhancement will result in wholesale
desertion of corporate directorships. In fact, there are some
reasons to believe that directors may be willing to serve even in
the face of potential increased liability. Certainly, the notion that
directors will not serve if confronted with significant risk of legal
liability appears particularly compelling considering that outside
directors have other sources of income and that the salary they
receive appears to be nominal.315 For example, Enron reported
that its nonemployee directors receive an annual service fee of
$50,000 and $1250 per board meeting and committee meeting.316
Given the number of meetings directors typically attend, Enron
compensation for outside directors is inferably between $66,250
and $82,500 per year.317 When viewed against the costs of
potentially millions of dollars in liability, this relatively modest
amount does not necessarily seem a sufficient benefit. However,
such an assessment fails to appreciate the nonmonetary benefits
associated with serving as a director. Serving as a director
represents membership in an elite club, conferring upon its
members reputational and other benefits. Although increased
liability may undermine the advantages of that club
membership, it nonetheless represents an important aspect of a
person’s willingness to serve. Then too, directors’ salaries may
not be as nominal as they appear at first glance. Indeed,
including cash and stock, the total remuneration fees for each
Enron director in 2001 were roughly $380,000.318 Moreover, a
study of the top 200 U.S. public companies revealed that the
average total board compensation for such companies was nearly
$140,000.319 While the generous salary of Enron directors raises

315. See Baum & Byrne, supra note 312, at 54–58.
316. Enron Proxy Statement, supra note 196 at 12.
317. In 2000, all Enron directors attended at least 75% of the total number of
meetings, which included nine board meetings and an additional eight to seventeen other
meetings depending on the individual subcommittee. See id. at 9–10.
318. See Reed Abelson, Enron Board Comes Under a Storm of Criticism, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2001, § 3, at 4.
319. See Subcommittee on Investigations Report, supra note 22, at 11 n.9 (citing
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS, REPORT OF THE NACD BLUE RIBBON
COMMISSION ON DIRECTOR COMPENSATION: PURPOSE, PRINCIPLES, AND BEST PRACTICES V
(2001)).
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questions about their ability to monitor officers responsible for
conferring upon them such a salary, it also suggests that some
directors may be more willing to serve than the nominal
characterizations of their salaries would suggest.
Nevertheless, given the fact that many directors do in fact
receive a relatively small salary, the potential for at least some
form of director desertion appears undeniable. Therefore, we
must investigate ways to prevent this from occurring. Although a
full assessment of measures for reducing this cost is beyond the
scope of this Article, it is possible to make some suggestions
about measures for consideration.
First, the need for legal sanctions may cause us to reconsider
the utility of relying primarily, if not completely, on outside
directors. Although enhancing directors’ exposure to legal
liability may have an impact on all directors, it may be
particularly problematic for outside directors. Unlike inside
directors, who rely on the corporation for their livelihood and
may find it more difficult to refuse service as a director, outside
directors have other employment and can more readily reject
participation on boards. In this respect, even if corporations can
find directors, augmenting legal sanctions may have the
unintended consequence of making it more difficult to find
directors outside the corporate enterprise. In the current climate,
this difficulty has serious corporate governance implications.
Indeed, reform efforts have emphasized the importance of
ensuring that boards contain a majority of outside directors.320
Some reforms not only make this a requirement,321 but also
require that certain committees, such as the audit and
nominating committees, be comprised completely of outside
directors.322 This Article suggests that these reforms cannot have
it both ways—that is, they cannot require that boards include
outside members and expose those members to real liability.
Which of these goals should give way? The preference for outside
directors reflects a belief that such directors will be less
conflicted and thus better able to perform their monitoring

320. See Ribstein, supra note 34, at 11–12 (describing various reform measures
focusing on outside directors and director independence).
321. See NYSE Listing Standards § 303A.01(1), http://www.nyse.com/lcm (last visited
Jan. 29, 2005) (requiring companies listed on the stock exchange to have a majority of
independent directors).
322. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3) (Supp. II 2002) (requiring
audit committee to be comprised solely of independent directors); NYSE Listed Company
Manual § 303A.04(8) (requiring members of the nominating or corporate governance
committee to be independent, defined as not having any material relationship with the
corporation).
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duties. Enron appears to support this belief. However, empirical
evidence on the impact of outside directors is equivocal.323 Given
this evidence, and the fact that enhancing directors’ exposure to
legal liability may make it more difficult to attract outside
directors, perhaps we should reconsider the appropriateness of
requiring the presence of outside directors.
Second, we might consider ways of capping directors’
liability to reach a more optimal level of deterrence that would
prevent instances of overdeterrence and make the cost of serving
as a director more acceptable. Such a cap seems appropriate if
the goal of legal liability is to deter director conduct and not to
compensate shareholders and other victims. Of course, it is
difficult without further research to determine what an optimal
level of liability would be. Indeed, Professors Black, Cheffins, and
Klausner have pinpointed some of the difficulties with
determining an optimal cap for director liability, particularly
when too low a cap may mean that plaintiffs have no incentive to
bring suits against directors.324 However, Sarbanes-Oxley’s
provisions regarding officers may provide a useful blueprint.
Indeed, directors could be subject to a maximum fine, a
maximum prison term, or both when found to have violated their
responsibilities under the Act.325 These ceilings could be similar
to those imposed on officers. Moreover, directors could be
required to disgorge any fees received if found to have breached
their monitoring duty.326 Sarbanes-Oxley includes a disgorgement
provision for CEOs and CFOs even if they are not found liable for

323. Indeed, several scholars have noted the equivocal evidence on board
independence and firm performance. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 34, at 375–76, 386–
90, 393–96 (criticizing the NYSE’s listing standard that requires independent board
members and presenting evidence that the committee’s assertions for the requirement
were misplaced); Lynne L. Dallas, Proposals for Reform of Corporate Boards of Directors:
The Dual Board and Board Ombudsperson, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 91, 111–14 (1997)
(discussing the mixed results of independent director studies); Jill E. Fisch, Taking
Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 276–80 (1997) (declaring “evidence
demonstrating a relationship between independence and profitability” to be “in short
supply”); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms,
and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797,
797–99 (2001) (reporting that the “trend toward independence . . . has encountered an
empirical sticking-point”); Ribstein, supra note 34, at 26–27 (discussing some “inherent
limitations on independent directors’ effectiveness”). See generally Sanjai Bhagat &
Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm
Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231 (2002) (reporting empirical evidence challenging the idea
that independent directors are essential to good corporate governance).
324. See BLACK ET AL., supra note 101, at 54–58.
325. See supra Part III.A (outlining the liability of officers who have violated their
duties).
326. Disgorgement of fees is not included in current director liability laws. See supra
Part III.C.2 (examining director liability).
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corporate wrongdoing.327 A similar provision for directors who are
found to have breached their responsibilities seems appropriate.
Including such liability provisions for directors may present a
more optimal level of risk for directors and may be an important
first step towards ensuring that we create some mechanism for
holding directors accountable for failing to perform their
responsibilities.
This subpart reveals that while imposing legal liability on
directors may entail some costs, those costs not only may be
exaggerated, but also may be minimized. More importantly,
given the importance of legal liability to the regulation of director
conduct, such costs must be absorbed into any corporate
governance system.
V. CONCLUSION
Corporate statutes confer upon directors an awesome power
to oversee corporations and the officers within those
corporations. With that power comes an obligation to ensure its
proper execution. Moreover, it seems inappropriate to allow
directors to delegate their power and then wash their hands of
any responsibility when the officers to whom they delegate the
power fail to exercise it appropriately. Indeed, the monitoring
functions inherent in directors’ fiduciary obligations recognize
the vital role directors must play in ensuring that officers do not
misuse their corporate authority.
Despite the significant impact that can stem from directors’
failure to curb abuses of that power, most scholars appear to
believe that legal penalties are not necessary to ensure that
directors comply with their obligations. These scholars insist that
extra-legal sanctions make legal penalties unnecessary, although
the cost of those penalties, particularly the possibility that
directors will refuse to serve or that they will serve in an overly
cautious manner, makes them undesirable. Thus, these scholars
support the current legal regime that ensures that directors face
little, if any, legal liability for failing to meet their fiduciary
duties.

327. Section 304 of Sarbanes-Oxley provides that if an issuer must prepare an
accounting restatement due to noncompliance with financial reporting requirements
under the federal securities laws and such restatement results from misconduct, the CEO
and CFO of the issuer must reimburse the issuer for any bonus, or other incentive-based
or equity-based compensation received and any profits realized from the sale of securities
during the twelve-month period following the public issuance or filing of such financial
reporting requirement. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (Supp. II 2002).
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This Article argues that the regime’s refusal to impose legal
liability on directors makes it defective, particularly given the
tremendous responsibility the regime gives to directors. In
shying away from direct legal sanctions and relying on extralegal forces to regulate director conduct, Sarbanes-Oxley appears
to repeat the mistakes of the current regime. Based on the
lessons learned from recent corporate governance debacles, it is
clear that extra-legal sanctions are not enough to ensure that
directors devote enough attention to their responsibilities.
Instead, this Article demonstrates that extra-legal sanctions
cannot be effective without the support of legal penalties. This
Article also demonstrates that legal sanctions have tremendous
power to shape director behavior and that it is both necessary
and appropriate to make use of that power in an effort to prevent
director misbehavior. Indeed, this Article concludes that
although legal liability has some costs, and hence its rod should
not be used without an appreciation of those costs and an
attempt to minimize them, sparing directors that rod altogether
may encourage them to engage in lax behavior to the detriment
of shareholders and the public alike.

